

THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE JOURNAL
NUMBER FOURTEEN

HUMAN PROBLEMS
IN
BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA
XIV

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Vol. LXXVII Part 1, 1947

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Editors

J. CLYDE MITCHELL
ELIZABETH COLSON and MAX GLUCKMAN

Five Shillings

Published by
THE RHODES-LIVINGSTONE INSTITUTE
LUSAKA, NORTHERN RHODESIA
1954

PRINTED IN SOUTH AFRICA BY THE CITADEL PRESS,
145, BREE STREET, CAPE TOWN

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DIVORCE LAW AND THE STABILITY OF MARRIAGE AMONG

THE LUNDA OF KAZEMBE*

by

A. L. EPSTEIN

I

THE Lunda kingdom of Kazembe to-day comprises a narrow strip of land which runs north and south for over a hundred miles along the east bank of the Luapula river. It is across this river that many of the tribes now settled in Northern Rhodesia are said to have come some centuries ago in their movement from Kola. But immigration into the valley has been going on for generations, and there seems always to have been great tribal admixture in the area. This is certainly true to-day, for the development of a fishing industry and the comparative prosperity of the region have attracted many immigrants from neighbouring tribes to come and settle. While everyone living in the kingdom owes allegiance to Kazembe, tribal consciousness is considerable, and people still speak of themselves as Chishinga, Tabwa, Lungu etc. At a political level this finds expression in the hostility that exists between Kazembe and the chiefs of these tribes, notably Chief Mushota of the Chishinga. Once, indeed, the late Kazembe Chinyanta proposed to the Administration that henceforth all people living within the tribal area should be regarded, and should regard themselves, as Lunda. This move was resisted by the other tribes of the district, and the Administration rejected the proposal. Nevertheless Kazembe's definition is convenient for the purposes of this paper and, unless qualified by the term 'proper', it is in this sense that I speak of Lunda.

Although custom is more or less homogeneous throughout the valley the factor of tribal mixture remains important in certain contexts.

* The material for this paper was collected in the course of a month's stay at Mwansabombwe, the Lunda capital. The paper was given first at a seminary of the Department of Social Anthropology at Manchester University, and I wish to thank Professor M. Gluckman, Dr. E. Colson, and Dr. I. Cunnison for their critical comments. In particular, I acknowledge my debt to Dr. Cunnison who has carried out intensive research on the Luapula, and with whom the paper has been carefully discussed. My thanks are also due to Dr. A. I. Richards and Mr. C. M. N. White, O.B.E. for their comments on an earlier draft.

The Lunda proper are the politically dominant group but they still recognize the ritual 'ownership of the land' of the Bwile and the Shila whom they found as occupants. Again, in matters affecting the kingship the Lunda are patrilineal. This affects not only succession to the kingship itself: important tribal offices which are associated with Lunda aristocratic names are always tied to the agnate line. In other respects the Lunda are, like all the other tribes, matrilineal, clan affiliation being traced in the maternal line. Such clans may operate as units of exogamy, but in the Luapula Valley clan sections (*fikota*, sing. *cikota*) are also recognized for this purpose where the split off took place long ago. Thus, recent immigrants may continue to recognize fellow clansmen outside the valley as still too closely related to permit of intermarriage: on the other hand there are clans in the valley represented by one or two sections which immigrated at different times, and perhaps from different directions between whom clanship is now considered to be so remote that intermarriage is permissible.

Typically, the clan section consists of those who trace their descent in the maternal line from a group of immigrants under a leader, spoken of as *cikolwe*, founder or ancestor, who was allocated land by Kazembe to settle a village. Cunnison defines the *cikota* as a matrilineal descent group of any number of generations whose members are clan fellows and come together to discuss *milandu* (cases); who may not intermarry; and within which any junior member may succeed to or take the place of any senior member.¹ But the *cikota* is not a corporate lineage within the terms of Gluckman's definition.² The *cikota* may divide, but the segments are not placed in a genealogical structure; they do not provide the nuclei of villages which together would form a local resident group against other similar groups in their own and other clans. Membership of a *cikota* does not determine residence. Although a village normally contains a nucleus of the headman's matrilineal descent group, clansmen of the headman do not account for more than a small proportion of the total village population. The larger part is made up of individuals who, attracted by the prestige and personality of the headman, have immigrated to join him. Though marriage is initially uxori-local, after the birth of two or three children, or before if he feels that witchcraft has been directed against him, the husband with the approval of his in-laws may take his wife to his own village or wherever else he chooses to settle. The rule of uxori-locality apart, there is no other imperative in residence.

¹ For a preliminary account of Lunda social organization see I. Cunnison, *Kinship and Local Organization on the Luapula* (Communications from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute No. 5, 1950).

² Gluckman, Introduction to *The Lamba Village*, by J. C. Mitchell and J. A. Barnes (Communications from the School of African Studies, No. 24 (N.S.), Cape Town, 1950), pp. 4-5.

II

In the indigenous Lunda law, divorce rarely came within the scope of the tribal courts. In common with many other tribes marriage among the Lunda was essentially the concern of the groups of kin of the respective spouses. Disputes arising out of a marriage were settled at a private gathering attended by senior members of the kin groups on each side. It was only where there was a failure to reach agreement that the matter might be referred to a chief's court: but his step appears to have been prompted more by a desire to avoid bloodshed than to have a judicial pronouncement on the case. In short, neither marriage nor divorce were the concern of the State. So far as contracting a marriage is concerned this is still the position to-day, though a couple may approach the Native Authority to have the marriage registered. But registration is voluntary: it is not necessary to confer legality upon the union. In the case of divorce, however, jurisdiction was vested in the Native Commissioners when the British South Africa Company established their Administration. Early records show the number of suits for divorce brought before the Native Commissioners to have been few, and it is probable that these affected only African staff and others living in the environs of the Boma or District Office.³ It was only in 1930, when Native Authorities were officially recognized by Government, that divorce jurisdiction was granted to Native Courts by warrants made under the terms of the Native Courts Ordinance of that year.⁴

From this time a divorce was recognized as valid only if the matter had been brought before a Native Court, adjudged upon, and a certificate, *kalata wa kulekana*, granted to the woman. This was so whether the marriage was celebrated as a Christian one or as a customary union, whether registered or unregistered.⁵ The customary procedure thus lost its legal significance. Indeed, it may already have lost much of its effectiveness, for, with many people working in the Belgian Congo or the more recently opened mines on the Copperbelt, it seems likely that the relatives who were the necessary witnesses under the old arrangement were no longer always able to be present in court to give evidence that the union had been dissolved. None the less the new procedure represented a departure which necessitated a change in the legal conception of the marriage relationship.

The English term divorce is rendered in Bemba—the language of the area—by the verb *kuleka*, reciprocal *kulekana*, and a suit in divorce

³ cf: Richards, *Bemba Marriage and Present Economic Conditions* (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 4, 1940), p. 106.

⁴ Now replaced by the Native Courts Ordinance, No. 10 of 1936, cap. 158 of the Laws of Northern Rhodesia.

⁵ In Northern Rhodesia a native marriage acquires no added legal status through having been celebrated according to the rites of a Christian Church. Again, the expression 'customary union' does not have the legal significance which it has in the Union of South Africa. For the Northern Rhodesian African the only valid marriage is the marriage according to native law and custom.

is spoken of as *mulandu wa kulekana*. But these expressions refer more properly to the idea of 'leaving' or 'separating from' one another than to divorce, if the latter is to be given its full legal significance. For, to the English lawyer at least, the concept of divorce implies that the termination of a marriage depends upon the decree of a court of law: until such a decree is granted the marriage is regarded as legally subsisting. This notion was wholly foreign to Lunda law and although it has been accepted and is applied by the Lunda courts its implications do not yet appear to be widely understood. Thus, once an educated and intelligent Lunda with whom I had been discussing the subject of marriage mentioned the case of an American he knew who had come to Northern Rhodesia leaving his wife at home. The American had now spent many years in the Territory, and the Lunda expressed surprise that he had not taken another wife. I explained that had he done so this would have constituted the crime of bigamy. 'Then you mean to say', he asked, 'that in your law those two are still considered man and wife?' It may well be that what puzzled the Lunda was the attitude of the Whites towards polygyny; but implicit too in his question is the view that marriage is synonymous with cohabitation: a marriage is an effective relationship between the spouses or it is nothing. Thus he found it hard to understand that in English law a couple who have been living apart for many years may still be regarded in law as man and wife because they are unable to satisfy the requirements about grounds of divorce. The view of marriage as a legal relationship the creation and dissolution of which are dependent upon the stamp of the State was alien to the indigenous Lunda law. Hence, too, the failure to distinguish between the concepts of divorce, nullity, and judicial separation.

In this sense Lunda divorce law is only of recent development, and is still almost wholly the creation of the tribal courts. It is usual for descriptive accounts of divorce law to begin by setting out the recognized grounds of divorce. This is a somewhat dangerous procedure because it overlooks the fact that the expression itself is ambiguous. Employed loosely it may simply refer to the facts adduced by a dissatisfied spouse on the basis of which he or she asks the court to dissolve the marriage. But grounds of divorce is also a technical concept with certain important implications which I will consider later. Therefore it seems better in these circumstances to begin by discussing some of the reasons which Lunda themselves give for seeking divorce. At the same time we will be able to notice how the courts handle these suits, and will thus be in a better position to examine the meaning of this concept in Lunda law.

It may be said at once that it is rare to find a case where the claim for divorce can be pinned down to one specific source of grievance—at any rate one which is stated explicitly in court. As the hearing progresses a number of varied grievances may be disclosed, though they may be linked by some common theme. Thus, to take an extreme

ase, cursing and drunken brawling on the part of the wife may be linked with her barrenness; and this in turn may have stemmed from the venereal disease she contracted from her husband. However, for the purposes of analysis it is possible to isolate some grievances which are frequently cited by parties seeking a divorce. One may mention here neglect in the performance of marital duties, desertion, adultery, and constant squabbling between the spouses. Disease too may be a source of complaint, especially where one of the parties has infected the other.

Of the cases heard the complaint that they had been neglected was made most frequently by wives in a polygamous union⁶ who felt that they were receiving less attention from their husbands than was their due: but the elements generally stressed in court were the failure of the husband to prepare gardens, to provide food, and very important in modern Lunda society, fine clothes. In the Case of the Rationalizing Wife⁷ it was the husband who brought suit for divorce. He explained that troubles began between himself and his wife about four years after their marriage in 1936. Recently he had married again, and not having enough money to build his second wife a house, he had asked his first wife to help. She gave him £3. He claimed that after that, his first wife no longer wanted to live with him, and was insisting on a divorce. He had called upon her parents to advise them, and they had persuaded her to stay on. But their troubles had continued and now he had come to seek the assistance of the court.

The wife denied that the case had anything to do with the building of a house for the second wife. She alleged that the dispute arose out of a breach of tribal etiquette committed by her husband. On one occasion she had brewed beer as *matebeto*—i.e., as a customary gift which is made from time to time by the parents-in-law to the husband of their daughter—and her husband, annoyed because she refused to give him some of the beer, followed her to the hut of their son-in-law. There was a quarrel between them, after which the husband went away. When he returned she refused to live with him.

When I discussed the case later with the court members they explained that while the breach of etiquette was blameworthy they did not consider it serious enough to warrant a divorce. Indeed, it is clear from the terms of their judgment that they considered the woman was only seizing upon the incident as an outlet for her jealousy, aroused when her husband had a short time before taken a second wife. 'A man is free to have as many wives as he wishes', the court declared, 'it all depends on his capacity to support them properly.' Addressing the husband the President of the court said:

⁶ Dr. Cunnison tells me, however, that polygamy is rare except where a man has inherited wives. He adds that the maintenance of large households is confined to a few of the most important of the *Bakalunda* or Lunda aristocrats.

⁷ For ease of reference I have adopted the practice of the earliest English law reports of giving each case a distinctive title. This method has also been adopted by Professor Gluckman for his work on Lozi law.

'When your wife cooked food for your son-in-law you followed her to the hut to share it. There you were in the wrong. And you were wrong again in neglecting her. This is just like the case of Kantwa who also neglected his first wife for a second. We see that you were married in the time of Kazembe Kamina. That is a long time ago, and in that time you have never brought a case before this court. For this reason you cannot be allowed to break the marriage. You are to be praised that when your wife told you to take your goods from the house you did not become angry, but waited until the case had been brought for hearing before this court. This shows that you loved your wife. But because you were wrong in treating your wife as you did you will pay a fee of five shillings to the court. Your wife is sick now and it is your duty to look after her.'

The theme of this judgment, that the parties had lived together for a long time and therefore ought not to be allowed to break their marriage, is one that recurs frequently in the hearing of matrimonial cases. Thus in a somewhat similar case, that of the Neglected Mwadi,⁸ an old woman complained to the court that her husband spent most of his time with another wife and only visited herself rarely. But the court again refused a divorce although the matter had been before it on three previous occasions.

'Listen, you have already been before this court three times over this matter. The last time you came you heard the advice of your children that you should not divorce one another. They would find it difficult to refer to the people you would marry as father and mother. We act on that advice. There are no special reasons for divorce. The wife's real complaint is that you, Mpiya, the husband, do not stay at her place. Her case is based on jealousy. But this time you have not fought together. So our judgment is that you both go and mend your ways. You, Mpiya, see if you can't build a hut nearer that of your senior wife.'

The attitude adopted by the court in this last case reflects the view, to which I will refer again, that there are strong ties of ritual interdependence by which the parties to a first marriage are bound to one another, and which serve to distinguish it from other marriages. With this there may be linked, too, a view that it is the first task of the court to attempt to reconcile the parties. Where the marriage is of long standing the presumption is that the couple are really compatible, and the chances of reconciliation are therefore good.

The term desertion is used here to describe that type of case where the husband, leaving his wife at home in the village, goes away to the railway line and over a period of time sends back nothing for her support. The procedure in these cases is slightly different from those already discussed, since by definition only one party is present at the hearing of the suit, unless the husband is represented by his relatives. Sometimes a woman will approach the court and produce a letter from her husband to the effect that she should now consider herself as divorced and free to remarry. In this event the case will be adjourned until the tribal court is able to get in contact with the husband, possibly through the agency of one of the Urban Native

⁸ See p. 9.

courts, to enquire his reasons for wanting a divorce. In the absence of good reasons the Urban court will be asked to collect £2 from the husband and forward it to the tribal court. This money will then be handed over to the woman for having been divorced 'without rounds'. Where the attempt to trace the husband fails a certificate of divorce is granted to the woman after the passage of a reasonable time. In practice this means after a number of letters have been exchanged between the urban and tribal courts. I was told that a similar procedure was followed where a woman appears before the court and complains that her husband had sent her back from the Copperbelt, and she has since had no word from him. A divorce will be granted to the woman if she can show that she has not been supported by her husband over a period which is now fixed by the Native Authority. Initially this was three years, but later it was changed to two, and at the time of my visit it was contemplated that the period would be further reduced at the next full meeting of the Council of the Lunda Native Authority.

The link between desertion and adultery is a close one, for the latter is often but a product of the former. In the typical case the husband returns to his village to discover that his wife has committed adultery. This offence is known as *bucende*. If she is actually living with another man as his 'wife' this is an even more serious offence, defined from the stand-point of the offending male as *kupoka muka bene*, the taking of another man's wife. In the latter case the husband will always be able to succeed against the male defendant in a claim for damages unless the wife is able to produce a certificate of divorce. For, on the law now administered in the Lunda courts, a marriage is regarded as subsisting, however long has been the period of desertion, until it is judicially dissolved. An older woman may accept this state of affairs with resignation. I met one such woman who claimed that she had had no communication from her husband for about twelve years. She lived alone, and had no children, but she still regarded herself as his wife. She told me that she had never sought a divorce because she was afraid that if she approached the court without a letter from her husband authorizing the divorce she would be ordered to pay heavy compensation. But other and possibly younger women regard themselves as free to remarry in these circumstances without the formality of the divorce certificate. In one case of this type the male defendant pleaded that in 'marrying' another man's wife he had acted in all innocence. When he first came to the village he had noticed the female defendant with a child, and thought she was married. But when some time had elapsed and he saw no husband he approached her with a view to marriage. She told him that she had been married but that her husband, the present complainant, had gone back to his own country and was not returning. He sent a gift of ten francs to her parents who consented to the marriage. Later he made further marriage payment of ten shillings. He was examined by the court as follows :

- Q. 'Suppose that after staying with a woman for a time you should think of divorcing her, what would you do?'
- A. 'I would take her to court.'
- Q. 'And what would the court do about it?'
- A. 'It would separate us.'
- Q. 'But what does it do when it separates a couple?'
- A. 'It issues a certificate.'

The defendant was thus found to have been negligent in marrying the woman without first having made sure that she had a certificate of divorce. He was ordered to pay £7 compensation to the injured husband and was allowed to take the woman as his wife.

It is this latter factor which serves to distinguish the two offences of *bucende* and *kupoka muka bene*. Unlike the modern English law in which a claim for damages for adultery has to be 'tacked on' to a petition for divorce, a case of adultery and a suit for divorce are held quite distinct by the Lunda. Normally in bringing a claim for damages for adultery a husband does not intend that his own marriage should be dissolved. In a sense the action is a reaffirmation of the marriage, and I was told that in former times the matter was finally settled by the ritual sharing of food between all the parties concerned as a symbol of their reconciliation. Some informants even said that formerly the damages were supposed to be handed over by the husband to the woman's parents since it was considered improper that he should profit by his wife's mistakes. To-day adultery is spoken of as a reason for a husband seeking to divorce his wife, but in fact I did not hear one case where adultery itself was the source of complaint. More often it was introduced incidentally, as a kind of peg on which to hang the rest of the case. Thus a husband once led evidence of his wife's misconduct to establish that she had infected him with venereal disease. An interesting illustration of this point was provided by the Case of the Barren Wife. Here the wife sought a divorce on the grounds that her husband was responsible for her present barrenness. There is a belief widespread throughout this area that adultery by a husband during the period of his wife's pregnancy may result in her death unless special medicines are administered. In fact while the wife was pregnant she became ill and her husband consulted a magician, *ng'anga*, in order to get some of the medicine, *muti wa ncila*. When later she had a miscarriage she attributed the trouble to the fact that her husband had committed adultery. Although, as it happened, the husband admitted his offence in court, the court members told me that they would have accepted the adultery as established from the fact that the husband had consulted the magician. The divorce was granted.

The fact that one spouse has contracted a disease, or has been infected with it by the other, may lead to a suit for divorce. But the courts normally disapprove of the divorce in these circumstances. The court members will warn a husband that it is unwise to divorce

s wife while she is ill or pregnant. Similarly I have heard a man suffering from leprosy plead that his wife could not be allowed to divorce him until he had been cured. Two ideas are probably at work here. In the first place the courts are reluctant to entertain a case if it appears likely that further claims arising out of the same legal relationship may be brought at a later date. Thus where a party complains that he has been bruised or burnt by the act of another the case will normally be adjourned until the wounds have healed, and the full consequences of the act can be measured by the court. In the same way a man would almost certainly be held responsible in Lunda cases if, having divorced his wife while she was pregnant, she died in giving birth to the child.⁹ Secondly, custom prescribes that on a girl's first marriage she should be given the *mafunde* or marriage instructions. She is instructed, *inter alia*, in the ritual of the pot, *ng'o*,¹⁰ the effect of which is to create ritual interdependence between the spouses. The well-being of each, and of the children, depends upon and may be affected by the behaviour of the other. Consequently, it is believed that if a woman leaves a man while he is suffering from some disease, and he dies, his spirit may return and take vengeance by killing the children.

Finally, there are a number of complaints commonly laid before the courts which may be referred to collectively as 'misunderstandings in the house', *macushi ya mu ng'anda*. Generally such troubles refer to drunkenness, fighting, and constant bickering between the spouses. The Case of the Fearful Husband is of this kind, and illustrates well the type of link created by the marriage with *mafunde*. By reason of the *mafunde*, which are given only in the case of a first marriage, the senior wife enjoys a special status and is referred to as *mwadi* or *mukolo*. She alone can join with her husband in the ritual of the pot, and purify him after intercourse with his other wives. The present case was brought by the husband. He complained that his senior wife, Rackelo, drank to excess, and on occasion became uncontrollable. Once when he had upbraided her she cursed him saying that the next time he went to Lake Mweru on a fishing expedition he would be drowned. Because she was *mwadi* her curses were regarded as having a special potency, and he was much afraid. He said:

'This woman has cursed me, and we must divorce one another. She must revoke her curse, and guarantee that I remain free of sickness for the next three years. Then I will consider her absolved from the curse.'

⁹ Quære whether such an action would lie to-day in view of s11 of the Native Courts Ordinance which excludes from the jurisdiction of a native court any case in which death is alleged as the cause of the action. My impression was that where there is a 'strong' Native Authority as on the Luapula or among the neighbouring Bemba, the Administration tends to 'leave the courts alone', and it may be that a decision of a Lunda court granting a remedy in this type of case would be allowed to stand.

¹⁰ cf: Richards, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-1.

Rackelo agreed that what had angered her husband was the fact that she had cursed him. She proceeded to justify her conduct to the court :

‘ What I said was that it would be difficult for me to feed myself. I have no gardens and therefore I should be taken with him when he goes on a trip to Lake Mweru instead of his other wife who has gardens. I have no parents (i.e., relatives) here. All I have is your pocket and if you go away it makes things very hard for me.’

The court addressed her husband :

‘ You are her all. If you go away leaving your wife behind you put her to great suffering. If she steals or misbehaves it is you who will be to blame because you do not want to help her. Do you really wish to divorce her ?’ (A brief discussion followed between the court members, one of whom suggested that she could stay at a certain village where there were people who could help her). ‘ You, husband, you seem to be worried by her curses. But this is no reason for a divorce. Indeed, it is all the more reason why you should stay with her, so that you may convince her that any trouble which may arise in future is due to her curse.’

The court passed on to judgment :

‘ We find that there is a case of fighting, but we put that to one side. It is good that the woman should stay at the village of X (the one mentioned in their discussion) where she will be cared for. But there is no special reason for divorce. The husband will pay five shillings into court. That is all.’

The husband at once became angry and blurted out that he was not going to pay the fee. He was willing to pay the amount of compensation due on a divorce and that was all. The President of the court snapped back : ‘ Very well. We cannot force people to stay together if they do not choose to. You will pay your wife £2, plus the fee to the court. Divorce is granted.’

Thus far we have been discussing some of the reasons adduced by litigants suing for divorce in a Lunda court, and we have seen something of the way in which the court entertains such suits. We must now take the analysis a stage further to try and discover what principles underlie the court's handling of these various situations.

In those legal systems where divorce jurisdiction is a function of the State, and divorce law forms but one branch of the law administered in the State tribunals, the expression ‘ grounds of divorce ’ at once becomes a term of art and involves certain implications. Of these perhaps the most important is that only certain recognized grievances will ground a divorce at the suit of one party to a marriage. These grievances are defined by law, and the onus lies upon the petitioner to prove that his complaints fall within one or other of the categories so defined. Only if the court is satisfied on the evidence before it that the petitioner has established his case will it pronounce a decree of divorce : if he fails to discharge this burden his petition will be dismissed. Thus the grounds of divorce are defined initially in legal terms, and the task of the court comes to be regarded as the measuring of the varying situations of social life against these criteria. To take an example from English law : a husband is entitled to seek a divorce

on the grounds of his wife's adultery and, at the same time, to claim damages against the co-respondent; but if the wife is able to establish her husband's wilful refusal to consummate the marriage she will be entitled to a decree of nullity. Since the effect of such a decree is a declaration that there never was a marriage the petitioner has no remedy against the co-respondent, for in these circumstances there can have been no question of adultery on the part of the wife.

This is not to imply that in these legal systems the judicial process is a purely mechanical one. The legal criteria adopted may still leave much scope for 'liberal' interpretation. This point emerges very early, for example, in the material presented by the Lynds in their study of Middletown. In Middletown by 1924 the frequency of divorce, and the speed with which divorce was rushed through had become a commonplace. Anybody with twenty-five dollars could get a divorce, it was said. The Lynds point out that a growing flexibility in the law, particularly in the interpretation of cruelty as a ground for divorce, meant that it was possible to obtain a divorce on charges other than specific ones like adultery and abandonment. But this does not affect the present argument, for even though the grounds alleged may do nothing more than roughly suggest, or even disguise, the real issue between husband and wife, the case must still be presented in the conventional form.¹¹

In a Lunda court the real issues may be, and probably often are, disguised, but the point to notice is that the issues are not presented in the conventional form associated with, for example, the Anglo-American system. For the factors which I have enumerated here—neglect, desertion, misunderstandings etc.—are not regarded as legal categories of Lunda law. They are not considered as the ingredients of an issue, each more or less carefully defined and strictly to be proved. If a Lunda woman seeks to divorce her husband because of his ill-treatment or neglect the court is not normally over-concerned about establishing such ill-treatment or neglect as a fact, or in relating it to any specific rule of law. The approach of a Lunda court to this problem is somewhat different. It tends to look to the marriage relationship as a whole, and it is important to bear in mind that this relationship embraces not only the spouses themselves but also their close kinsfolk. To-day there is an undoubted tendency towards a more individual type of marriage relationship and many divorces appear to be heard and decided without reference to the kinsfolk, but the importance of the older principle is still to be seen in the Case of the Neglected Mwadi where the court referred to the advice of the children and acted upon it. Accordingly, we have to regard the 'grounds' adduced by a petitioner for divorce merely as the broad reasons by which the court satisfies itself that the couple are no longer able to live together in harmony, and that it would be better to allow them to separate.

¹¹ H. M. and R. Lynd, *Middletown* (New York, 1929), p. 121 *et seq.*

This is seen more clearly if we consider a second consequence which stems from the concept of grounds of divorce. To-day new grounds of complaint against a spouse are frequently to be heard in the courts. Thus a wife may seek a divorce claiming that her husband is a pagan, or a husband because his wife is uneducated, and the divorce may be granted in each case. But it does not follow from this that for the future it will be sufficient merely to show that one's wife is not a Christian or that one's wife is illiterate in order to get a divorce. The case must be heard in the customary fashion, and only if it becomes clear that husband and wife can no longer live together in amity will the court dissolve the union. In considering grounds of divorce in Lunda law one cannot argue from the particular to the general.

To speak of grounds of divorce in a legal context implies that these grounds are limited and specific. A genuine source of grievance on the part of one spouse does not necessarily constitute a ground for divorce. The crucial element in the concept is the obligation on the court to refuse a divorce where no sufficient cause is made out. A Lunda court can and will dismiss a suit for divorce. In the Case of the Leprous Husband the wife sought a divorce because her husband's frequent drunkenness had led to unhappiness in the marriage. He had frequently beaten her and eventually she sought a divorce in the Belgian Congo where they were living at the time. As the Congo court insisted on her paying a sum of 800 francs to her husband as compensation for all the dresses and other goods she had received from him in the course of the marriage she had gone back to live with him. Later they both returned to Kazembe's village, but her husband continued to ill-treat her until at last she was forced to seek protection from her section headman. The husband defended the suit. He denied having beaten his wife, and he claimed that she could not divorce him until he had been cured of leprosy. In the course of her statement the wife alleged that her husband had broken her lip, and that the wound had been treated by his sister. The husband's sister was called to give evidence on this point. She denied all knowledge of the incident. 'These people are old enough to be able to manage their own marriage problems, and should not involve me in it', she declared. 'The real reason that she wants a divorce is that her husband has leprosy. There are many who fight in a marriage, but that is no reason for a divorce.'

The President of the court summed up :

'The husband states that he did not beat you at all. He only beat you in the Congo. But since you came back here he has not done so. But you say that you are beaten all the time, and that he has damaged your lip. This is like a man who has a dog. If he keeps on beating it it will become afraid, and will not answer to his call. But what do you say now? Your husband says that you are his wife.'

The wife appeared to agree that she should not divorce her husband while he had leprosy, but she repeated that what angered her was that whenever he became drunk he beat her. The court passed to judgment.

' The case heard in the Belgian Congo is a different matter. We are only concerned with what happened here. It seems that your wife has been very much afraid of you, but as you did not actually beat her this time the court has decided that you cannot divorce. You must treat her well, and you should not drink so much because it is " a weakening of the mind " (using the English expression). According to the case there is no reason for a divorce, but you should both go and live peacefully together.'

In the Case of the Leprous Husband the court has taken a decidedly legal ' view of the situation. The facts in issue, namely the beatings, are taken as crucial and the court dismisses the wife's suit because she has not fully established her case. But in fact the court was only able to adopt this course because the wife herself appeared agreeable to the marriage continuing. Similarly, the court was able to refuse a divorce in the Case of the Rationalizing Wife, not merely because the marriage was of long standing, but also because the fact that the matter had been discussed at an informal family council and the woman persuaded to stay with her husband, indicated that her people were interested in maintaining the marriage. Again, in the Case of the Neglected Mwadi the children of the marriage were not in favour of a divorce. Had the wife in the Case of the Leprous Husband insisted on a divorce as did the petitioner in the Case of the Fearful Husband there would have no doubt that it would have been granted.

At present jurisdiction in divorce vests solely in the tribal courts, and a divorce is valid unless sanctioned by the court. But the effectiveness of the courts in maintaining any particular union lies not in their political authority, but only in their ability to work in accord with extra-legal pressures already at work in the same direction. Where these pressures are absent, or are not sufficiently strong to influence the behaviour of the parties, the courts are powerless to refuse a divorce, even though the court members consider that the facts of the matter do not really warrant the dissolution of the marriage. In arriving at its decision a Lunda court is guided not by a concept of grounds of divorce which are limited and specific but by a more pragmatic criterion—whether the parties appear capable of settling their differences and living together in relative harmony and amity.

It would of course be possible to argue from this that there is in fact only one ground of divorce in Lunda law, that of incompatibility, but this view is valid only if one is prepared to argue further that the insistence on a divorce by one party is itself *prima facie* evidence of such incompatibility.¹²

¹² The view presented here is of more than mere academic interest. If it can be shown to apply in other tribal systems it would seem that the question of grounds of divorce has sometimes been misunderstood in legal and administrative quarters. The following case may be cited by way of illustration. A Yao woman sought a divorce from her husband, a Henga, in a Native court in Nyasaland. The wife claimed that she had been severely beaten, though the real source of friction between the spouses appears to have lain in their conflicting tribal customs. The Native court granted the divorce, and the husband appealed. The matter eventually reached the High Court where it was found as a fact that the beatings did not take place, and held accordingly that the Native court was wrong in granting a divorce on that ground.

III

Marriage in the Luapula Valley is accompanied by the making of certain payments by the man to his future parents-in-law. These payments are similar in nature and function to those described by Dr. Richards for the Bemba. They may be regarded as token payments whose transfer stamps the marriage as legal, and confers certain minimal rights upon the husband. The three principal payments differ in their incidence and must be distinguished. *Cilomba fwaka* is a token offering by which a man makes known his wish to marry a girl. Some time later he pays *busonge*, the receipt of which establishes that the marriage has the consent of the girl's people. Finally, in the case of a girl's first marriage, there is the payment for *cisungu*. This is identical with the *mpiya sha cisungu* paid by the Bemba,¹³ and does not return to the husband in the event of a divorce. As a court member once put it: the *cisungu* payment can no more be recovered than one can recover the price of a suit after one has bought and worn it. Informants were more uncertain about the return of the *busonge*. Some stated that its return in former times was one of the means of proving the dissolution of the marriage. Others said that it was never repaid, for if the members of the husband's family later wished to marry into his wife's family they would have difficulty in doing so. They added however that a show was always made of offering to return it, and the fact that the woman's people went with it to the husband's home was the token of divorce. But it was seldom accepted.

Whatever the position in the past about the return of *busonge*, to-day there is no question of its being returned on divorce. In few of the cases heard was there even any mention of the marriage payments. Instead there appears to have grown up a system of awards of compensation to one or other of the parties on the dissolution of the marriage. How this works is best seen in a consideration of the cases.

In the first of these the parties had been before the court on a number of occasions. On this occasion the husband came to complain of the constant squabbling that went on between himself and his wife. He alleged that she was always abusing him, and had attributed her childlessness to his impotence. Divorce was granted, but the wife was held to have been in the wrong and was ordered to pay her husband £5 compensation for 'forcing him to leave her'. In the Case of the Barren Wife, referred to above, the wife had three grounds of complaint. Firstly, she claimed that her husband did not support her; secondly, by infecting her with venereal disease he had made her barren; and thirdly, when she had gone into hospital for treatment he had not visited her. The judgment of the court was as follows:

'Your wife spoke well when she said that old men often make good husbands. She agreed to marry you because you had long experience in marriage. Her parents agreed and accepted your gift of fifteen shillings. After a while you

¹³ Richards, op. cit., p. 52 ff.

had a child. At that time your wife was free of disease, and your parents-in-law rejoiced. But when your wife was pregnant a second time there was trouble. Your wife seemed to be dying, and you sought a magician. She went into hospital and they were going to operate in order to save her life. The operation turned out to be unnecessary, but from that time she could not bear children. She stayed in the hospital for some time but as you did not come and help her she was not properly treated.

'Another thing is that you preferred selling the fish you caught to providing for your wife; and you refused to share with her the produce of your gardens, again preferring to sell it. So your wife has tired of making gardens and has decided to divorce you. This is your fault. Had she only thought of leaving you because of your age she would have paid you much money. As it is, she will pay you £3 compensation. You will give her £2 for having infected her with disease. She will also pay five shillings into court. The marriage is dissolved.'

The third case I wish to mention here is that of a husband who ought the case before the court because of his wife's constant nagging. He said: 'Though you may try and keep us together it won't work.' The essence of the matter is contained in the following brief judgment of the court.

'... you fought together while you were living on the Copperbelt, and also later when you returned home. It is said that the woman has shown disrespect to her husband. Nevertheless we find that there is no reason for a divorce. You, husband, will therefore pay £2 compensation to your wife.'

These three cases differ greatly in their internal detail. Yet there is one underlying thread running through all the judgments. This is the idea that people ought to be restrained from breaking their marriages, and that those responsible for the dissolution ought to be punished. After listening to a number of these cases one was forced to the conclusion that one brought a suit for divorce 'at one's peril'. The implications of this doctrine are seen most clearly in the Case of the Barren Wife. There it was the woman who brought suit, and who was granted a divorce. Yet it was also the woman who was ordered to pay heavy compensation. It seems fair to argue that if she was granted a divorce there must have been some substance in her complaint. On this view the effect of the decision must be to penalize the one who is without fault. But the Lunda courts take a different view. Court members argue that since it was the woman who insisted on a divorce, she was she who was really responsible for breaking the marriage.

Assessment of responsibility is therefore an important element of the present Lunda law, though it is not always easy for the observer to see on what grounds responsibility has been attributed to one party rather than to the other. What does stand out, however, is the way in which the scales are tipped against the woman, supported though she may be by the members of her kin-group. For, whereas a man who is guilty of breaking a marriage always pays compensation at the fixed rate of £2, a woman may be ordered to pay amounts ranging to £8 and more, according to the degree of culpability. I neglected to inquire how far women are assisted by their kinsfolk in the payment

of these sums. Nevertheless it is clear that divorce must entail greater hardship for a woman than for a man.¹⁴ Certainly the inequality is recognized by the courts, and even justified on the grounds that it is the women who are mostly responsible for the break-up of marriages. They are enticed by other men, especially when their husbands are absent from home, and come to court seeking divorce simply to marry their lovers. Court members at Kazembe told me that the system of awards of compensation was introduced to try and combat this abuse. Since the assumption seems to be that a woman suing for divorce always has a lover in the background the higher damages she may be called upon to pay may represent an attempt by the court to 'get at' the undetected lover. But this much is certain, that their purpose is both punitive and deterrent.

We may now state the underlying principles of Lunda divorce law in two propositions. The first is that, where possible, the marriage tie ought to be preserved. In accordance with this principle a Lunda court will strive first to bring about a reconciliation of the parties. It will placate the aggrieved party, and admonish the other, advising and instructing him how to live properly.¹⁵ Where one or other of the parties is adamant, and insists upon a divorce the court invokes the second proposition: the marriage tie is not lightly to be broken, and the party responsible for breaking it ought to be punished. He or she must pay punitive damages to the other.

However, these are not merely legal propositions: they are at the same time a statement of Lunda morals. Their enunciation in this form by the courts stems from the multiplex functions of Lunda court members. The office of court membership is of high honour and importance. The holding of courts dates back to the very beginnings of Lunda(Kazembe) history when Mwata Yamvwa appointed Kalandala to be 'law officer' to Kazembe. The court member is never merely a judge whose sole concern is with the administration of justice. He is also a political head, and may even hold an aristocratic title associated with some high office of state. Thus all but one¹⁶ of the members of the court at Kazembe were headmen of village

¹⁴ But the following case from Chief Munkanta's court shows that a woman is not always depressed by this burden. The case-record reads: 'Hilder Kalulu married Koni. Their marriage lasted thirteen years. But then Hilder began to disregard what her husband told her. Now their case has come before this court. Each party has been given the opportunity to state his case. Then it was known that Hilder really did not want to stay with her husband. Koni said what I should like is that my wife should come back to me: also she should stop going to "dances" and to other "games". But Hilder said she would not be stopped going to "dances" and they must be divorced.

Judgment: The court gives Hilder Kalulu a case because she is one who is forsaking her husband. She will pay him compensation of £20. Further we give all the children to Koni.' The record continues: 'And there and then Hilder got her purse and took out £20 and gave it to Koni.' ! !

¹⁵ cf: J. A. Barnes, *Marriage in a Changing Society* (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 20, 1951), p. 100.

¹⁶ This man however was a brother of Kazembe.

ctions in and around the capital, and one, the President, was the incumbent of one of the most important Lunda offices. When, in the case of the Leprous Husband, the woman ran away from her husband, fearing a beating, it was from the President of the court, as her section headman, that she sought protection. In their capacity as headmen, therefore, court members are responsible for the general social and moral welfare of the peoples in their charge and, by extension, for the country as a whole. Thus the development by the courts of a punitive element in the divorce law emerges as an immediate reflection of the concern felt by the leaders of the community at the growing instability of Lunda marriage.

Evans-Pritchard has argued that marriage derives its stability from the restraints imposed by Law and morals. 'It is morals which ensure divorce, and law that refuses to recognize grounds for divorce which ensure the stability of the union of husband and wife'.¹⁷ In the past the moral significance of marriage was expressed in the ceremony and ritual which surrounded it. A young man was free to choose his own bride, but in general the personal inclinations of the young people were not of primary importance. The man had to satisfy his people that the girl came of a family of good repute and good character before they would give their approval to the union. The fact that it was a union of two families as much as of two individuals was emphasized in the custom of the *matebeto* by which, on the day following the formal consummation of the marriage, kinsfolk of husband came together to consume food and beer specially prepared for them by the girl's people. The same day the couple were paraded in public. Members of both their families assembled to greet them and to offer advice or 'instructions' (*kufunda*). At the same time they were introduced to each other's kin, and had their various relationships explained. But the deepest expression of the Lunda attitude towards marriage was probably to be found in the *cisungu* rites. These rites were performed when a girl reached puberty, and celebrated her initiation into womanhood. I am not able to say how far these rites corresponded with those described for the Bemba, but it seems clear that the conclusion of the rites coincided with the marriage ceremonial itself, with the formal consummation of the marriage of 'eating of the *cisungu*'. A marriage accompanied by the 'eating of the *cisungu*' was distinguished from other unions and, as we have seen, created mystical links between husband and wife.

This account of the marriage ceremonial is necessarily brief, yet enough has been said to show that for the Lunda, unlike the Lozi,¹⁸ the ceremony of marriage was not just 'a play of children'. The marriage ceremonial served not merely to accord public recognition

¹⁷ Evans-Pritchard, 'The Social Character of Bride-wealth', *Man*, xxxiv, 1934, No. 194.

¹⁸ Gluckman, 'Kinship and Marriage among the Lozi of Northern Rhodesia and the Zulu of Natal', in Radcliffe-Brown and Daryll Forde, eds., *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage* (Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 190.

to the union, but also to express the deep public interest in it. To-day many of the old customs and beliefs are dying out but public interest is still reflected in the fact that when a marriage takes place in the capital Kazembe himself calls the couple and their parents before him and addresses them on the importance of marriage. Nevertheless we cannot assert that these factors gave Lunda marriage stability in the past. In many respects the marriage systems of the Bemba and the Lunda are similar. The Bemba too attached great importance to the *cisungu*, yet Gouldsbury and Sheane, who speak of the *cisungu* as the ordinary marriage ceremony, have stated that the *cisungu* form was less binding than the *bwinga* form found among the neighbouring Mambwe-Lungu peoples. They found that among the Bemba divorce was much more frequent than among these other tribes. Divorce in fact was easy, and a divorced daughter was always welcomed back to her people with open arms. They point out, indeed, that if a son-in-law were inattentive to his parents-in-law, or did not work in their gardens, they themselves took the initiative and removed their daughter.¹⁹

I consider that what Gouldsbury and Sheane found for the Bemba is equally true of the Lunda. It accords also, I believe, with Cunnison's statement that in the old days Lunda regarded it as desirable to be kin already to the family into which one married. This was so because only where the spouses were already linked by non-official ties could serious cases be avoided.²⁰ Mr. Cunnison has not yet given us the information to show what proportion of marriages were of this preferential type, but his statement does carry the implication that marriages outside this class were inherently unstable.

Lunda marriage does not involve the transfer of the woman's fertility to the husband's group. Her children are not affiliated to her husband's *cikota* but to her own, whosoever their genitor may be. Claims for the custody of children are rare even to-day. Children, it is said, belong to both sides and will go to one or other of the parents as they choose.²¹ Nevertheless it is to his matrilineal kinsmen that a man will come to look for assistance, from them he will inherit, and one of them will succeed him. Ultimately it is among his matrilineal kinsmen that a man tends to settle. Again, a woman always remains associated with her own *cikota*, and a husband's rights in his wife are fundamentally temporary and insecure. We will see this more clearly if we refer once more to the belief in *ncila*. We have seen that the Lunda believe that a husband who commits adultery while his wife is pregnant endangers her life. In Lunda law should the wife die while pregnant or in giving birth her people have a cause of action against the husband, who may be called upon to pay heavy damages.

¹⁹ Gouldsbury and Sheane, *The Great Plateau of Northern Rhodesia* (London, 1911), pp. 158, 168. cf. Richards, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

²⁰ Cunnison, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

²¹ But see Koni's case, p. 16. f.n.

ut adultery by the wife herself when pregnant may also lead to her death. In this instance however death does not ground an action at the suit of the husband against the wife's kin. In the first case an action lies because the *cikota* has been deprived of one of its members through the fault of an outsider; in the latter the husband has no action because he has not been deprived of anything, for his wife does not 'belong' to him. A Lunda woman does not pass *in manu maris*.

At the present time Lunda marriage is markedly unstable, and what figures are available show that the numbers of suits for divorce brought before the courts are mounting yearly. This state of affairs may be traced in large measure to the influence of modern conditions. As we have just seen, the development of a punitive element in the law is an immediate reflection of the concern felt by the Lunda authorities at this situation. Nevertheless it cannot be asserted that modern conditions created this instability. On the contrary, what evidence there suggests that the marital tie was always relatively weak, and that modern conditions have merely exacerbated a tendency inherent in the Lunda social system. Yet if we are forced to the negative conclusion that neither law nor morals were able to give Lunda marriage stability in the past we are still left with the problem of squaring this instability with its high degree of sacralisation. Clearly the Lunda attached, and still attach, a very high value to the institution of marriage, which is reflected, for the past, in the set of rites and beliefs which form the *cisungu* complex, and, for the present, in the tendency of the Native Authority to assume greater responsibility for its control. But for an understanding of that value we need an analysis of the marriage relationship itself, and of its relation to the other elements of the Lunda social system.

A NOTE ON THE LUNDA CONCEPT OF CUSTOM

by

IAN CUNNISON

THIS article¹ discusses the Lunda word *lutambi*. The word means roughly 'custom'. Much has been written about the force which custom exerts in non-European societies, and a case has been made for claiming that 'custom is king' and that people in such societies are its slaves. Such claims have been put forward, however, only in respect of homogeneous, 'untouched' societies, of a kind which may never have existed outside the minds of theorists. Thus it is perhaps worth while to consider how universal are customary beliefs in a modern African society which is far removed from this 'primitive' condition.

In very brief review, the Lunda state in the Luapula Valley consists of a powerful chief, Kazembe, with a number of territorial sub-chiefs. People of some twenty different tribes live side by side and intermarried in a string of densely sited villages along the road bordering the Luapula swamps. These people have come mostly from the surrounding plateau districts. There are some forty clans cutting across tribal allegiances. With each of the tribes, certain customs are associated, and thus customs of a wide area are represented: the customs of the indigenous Shila, of the conquering Lunda, and of the other tribes whose homes are scattered widely over the north-eastern Rhodesia and the Katanga. Customs are further varied by the different values which people place on European civilization, from adherents of chieftainship on the one pole to adherents of missions on the other.

Africans in the field of custom in general recognize that there are notable differences between their own tribes and also between themselves and Europeans. Some people live in scattered hamlets, others in big villages, while Europeans live in towns. Among themselves they recognize that there are various methods of cultivation, various ways of making a livelihood, various kinds of chieftainship or lack of it, and so on; and *a fortiori* they see differences between themselves and Europeans.

The Luapula peoples are of course best acquainted with the tribes which are present in their country. They know they differ in many

¹ The writer made an anthropological study of the Luapula peoples between 1948 and 1951 for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

ays. Their histories are familiar and it is recognized that they have different ancestries and that they come from different places. The Nkanga characteristically fish, the Lungu characteristically cultivate finger-millet in addition to the staple cassava. It is well known that each tribe remembers its own chiefs outside the valley and continues to pay them respect. In addition, characters are given to tribes. The Nkanga are said to be cruel, but country bumpkins. The Lomotwa of the Kundelungu Hills are said to be vengeful and angry. The Tabwa are said to be malevolent sorcerers. Knowledge of more distant tribes is less and attitudes to them not so marked; but Nyasalanders are said to be skilled in learning and the Lozi to be arrogant.

Beside the recognized differences, it is believed that there are many things *common* to all people, including Europeans. There are certain institutions and traits which all mankind possesses, certain things which must exist so long as men exist. One of these is the clan. This is understood as a group of unilineal relatives united by the name of a natural object. Although the Lunda have been in contact with societies which in fact never had clans (the Yeke for example) Lunda say that these people must have had clans but have forgotten them. Europeans deny to Lunda that they have clans, but Lunda are sure Europeans have them, and want to hide the fact for some reason. Likewise to the Lunda there can be no society without sorcerers to make life unpleasant for the rest. Institutions such as marriage, the family, positional succession and so on are thought to be universal.

I shall use the word 'custom' to translate the Luapula word *ntambi* (pl. *ntambi*). The institutions just mentioned are not in themselves 'customs' in the Lunda sense. Although every society has customs, in view of Lunda, clans, marriage and so forth these are not customs in themselves. For each society has its own way of dealing with these institutions and it is these differentiating manners which are known as *ntambi*. Institutions like marriage and the clan are things without which no society would work: they are basic and given along with mankind. Variations within them, however, can be and are made, and the manner in which they are all adopted in any tribe constitutes the *ntambi* of that tribe.

Customs may comprise common-sense or mystical behaviour. Thus it is the custom of the Lungu to grow finger-millet as against the custom of the Lunda to grow cassava exclusively. It is the custom of the Lomotwa to deal vengefully with their enemies. It is the custom of the Greek fish-traders to speak Swahili. Likewise however it is the custom of the Lunda not to eat lion flesh on pain of death or madness, whereas it is the custom of the Luba who live to the west to eat lion flesh as relish.

Custom of this sort is *indivisible* in the sense that a certain body of customs is always associated with a particular tribe and that other bodies of custom are associated with other particular tribes. If a Lunda takes to cultivating finger-millet that means he has rejected the Lunda custom of not doing so and adopted the Lungu custom of

cultivating it. If a Lungu is succeeded by his son and not by his sister's son, that means that Lunda and not Lungu custom has been followed. Many Lunda now grow finger-millet but its cultivation has not become a Lunda custom. It is simply that the Lunda concerned have adopted the custom from the Lungu, or, as it might be expressed 'this is *ciLungu* (a Lunguism)'. It is now a common feature of marriage ceremonies for the bride on the eve of her wedding to go to a cassava garden with the girls of her village. There they tie bundles of cassava stalks to their backs, then crawl back to the bride's mother's hut while older women drive them along with switches. The idea is that the bride should be docile, like a cow. The action is accompanied by a song: 'The Bemba brought us the custom of crawling'. Thus custom is very closely bound up with the tribe with which it is in the first place associated.

Although both customs of common-sense matters and customs involving mystical notions are *ntambi* to the Lunda, Europeans distinguish between them in the following way: We see that Lunda consider customs of a common-sense nature as if the laws governing them were universal. We see that they consider customs involving mystical notions as if the laws governing them were not universal, but were universal only within the bounds of a certain group. Lunda realize that snake-bites cause serious wounds to everyone. They say that sun and mud cause dark pigmentation to everyone: to themselves because they are dark, and to Europeans because we become dark in their country. Likewise, in the realm of customs, they see that the custom of eating fish daily makes people sleek and fat like the wealthiest of the Lunda who eat fish every day.

In the second category however are beliefs of a different kind, which Europeans can follow only by assuming that Lunda when thinking about them make some mystical connexions. One tribe, A, has a certain taboo which, they say, if broken will cause death to the person who broke it. Another tribe B has no such taboo. Europeans understand that in fact the breaking of the taboo cannot of itself cause death. An African of tribe A knows that if he breaks the taboo he will die. An African of tribe B knows that if he acts in this way he will not die. But if you ask an African of tribe B whether or not a member of tribe A will die if the latter breaks the taboo, the answer is yes, but that a member of tribe B would not. Similarly, if you ask a member of tribe A whether or not a member of tribe B would die, the answer is he would not die, but that any member of tribe A breaking the taboo would die. A specific example of this is the fact that a Lunda must be purified after killing a lion before he speaks or eats, whereas a Luba needs no purification and eats lion flesh itself without harm. Lunda know they must not eat lion flesh and there is ritual to ensure that the presence of a dead lion in the country will not bring harm to the people. Luba take no such precautions. Lunda say that Lunda die or go mad without the necessary purifications, but they say that Luba do not.

Another common type of case which illustrates this point is the mystically caused disease. There is a sickness called *bwali* which is frequently followed by death. *Bwali* is also the word for mush. This disease, to the Lunda, is caused by adultery. If a married woman commits adultery, returns home and cooks for her husband, then when the husband eats the mush he may, they say, become ill. A magician is called and if he applies a cupping horn to the man's chest and on withdrawing it reveals the presence of mush in the horn, then the only remedy is for the wife to disclose the name of her lover. It is only the tribes resident on the Luapula that know this custom, and the Lunda say that Bemba wives who commit adultery do not bring this disease to their husbands.

Thus there is the situation where certain customs, when they involve mystical behaviour, are peculiar to certain groups and do not have the same effect in other groups. There is, however, a development of this. For example, the Lunda say that some years ago a European hunter, resident nearby, killed many animals and purified himself against their effects. He married an African wife who brought with her her marriage pot and he adopted the Lunda custom of purification in marriage. It is said that the hunter went mad, and that he went mad because he adopted the customs of a tribe other than his own.

I had an experience which brought comments on the same line. While hunting in 1949 I came near to shooting eland and dreamed about eland at night. In the morning I related the dream to my Lunda companions. One of them said: 'You have always been asking why we Africans purify ourselves if we kill big animals; it is to save us from dreaming about them as you did.' They advised me strongly not to go to a magician for this sort of purification, even if only to discover how it was done; it would cause me harm since I did not know the custom.

The taking of purifying medicines then is not believed to have an effect that is the same for everyone, and is a different kind of thing from an action such as eating fish which is believed to have the same effect for everyone. Nevertheless Africans of other tribes are affected in a way more closely resembling the way in which the Lunda are affected than are Europeans; for instance stranger Africans who marry Lunda women and live in the Luapula Valley adopt the custom of the marriage pot without trouble since, it is said, they already have analogous customs of their own.

On the other hand, even among the tribes living together on the Luapula, there are many cases where it is evident that their respective customs are *exclusive* and cannot be mixed. This applies particularly to customs involving mystical beliefs. I take an illustration from the case of the death of a village headman, who was Lunda by tribe. A magician had to be found to purify the village after the headman's death. Although the headman of the neighbouring village was of the same clan and, as a headman, knew appropriate medicines for purifying villages, the elders of the dead headman's section of the clan did not invite him because he was of a different tribe (Lungu). They said:

' We are Lunda, and this would be bringing in a Lunguism. This is a Lunda village and we follow Lunda custom ' ; and they sought a Lunda magician from a distance.

Again, there is frequent inter-tribal marriage, and marriage ceremonies have slight variations from tribe to tribe. One rite of representatives of some of the plateau tribes (e.g., the Tabwa) is for the bridegroom to enter the bride's house with a party of his fellows and, with a bow and arrow, to shoot the bride's shadow on the wall of her house. At the wedding of a Tabwa youth with a girl of the Shila tribe, to whom this custom is not known, the bridegroom's party forced entry into the bride's house, with bow and arrow. The bride's mother simply told them to go away, saying they did not have this custom. They went; and both sides were satisfied at having carried out their customs, at least in a token way. This is the normal pattern of behaviour on such occasions where customs may clash. Each party stresses its distinctiveness in custom but the affair is settled in an amicable manner.

It is to be noted that although custom is associated with tribe, it is the elders of the *clan* section to which a person belongs who see that he or she carries out the customs of the tribe to which the section belongs (for one clan may have sections belonging to many different tribes). On the Luapula at any rate the tribes, most of which are only portions of tribes whose homes lie elsewhere, have of themselves no organization through which this control could be exercised. The only exception to this is in regard to Lunda and Shila customs of chieftainship, which are controlled respectively by the Lunda aristocracy and the hereditary ' brothers ' and ' nephews ' of the Shila chief, Nkuba. Likewise it is the ancestors of the clan sections rather than of the tribe as such who are said to be concerned in the maintenance of customs, and it is said that the elders are interested in maintaining the customs mainly in order to retain the goodwill of these ancestors. In this matter generally speaking it is customs having some mystical content which are important here. Lunda have not put misfortunes down to the fact that whereas they once built grass houses they now build houses of Kimberley brick; nor do they consider that their ancestors would rise against them for starting to cultivate finger-millet. On the other hand if a man is left a widower then the customs which follow are controlled by the elders of his and his wife's clan sections. They see that he is properly purified of the death and that a successor is found for his wife so that he can end the taboos which he has been observing. To neglect these measures would be to bring misfortune upon both clan sections.

We have been discussing so far the customs of groups. The body of customs of a tribe we have described as being indivisible and exclusive. If a Lunda adopts in one respect the customs of the Lungu, the Lunda body of customs yet remains inviolate because it and the Lunda tribe are still identified together. But there is a complication because the association of individual persons with tribes follows no

dict set of rules. Generally speaking a person is of his mother's clan and of the tribe to which his mother's clan section is generally regarded belonging. In any event it is nearly always (except in the case of the trilineal Lunda aristocracy) a person's mother's clan who finds a successor to him at his death, and who inherit his property. During his lifetime however his allegiance is often directed equally towards the clans of his father and mother, and some, specially political, facts may make him identify himself especially with his father's clan and through this with his father's tribe. If this is the case, the man may also adopt the customs of his father's tribe. Again, if a man marries in a village district with a concentration of members of a tribe other than his own, he may even adopt the customs of his affines. This, in terms of what has been said above, means that a man by changing his tribal allegiance, can at the same time alter the effect which a certain action going to have upon him, if that action involves mystical belief.

The adoption of European customs and the dropping of indigenous customs under European influence is also greatly an individual matter. There are people at this time who retain former customs, or as many as do not offend against ideas of 'natural justice', living side by side with others who for one reason or another have decided to drop many of the old customs. We note briefly some of the changes which are taking place in the ritual of the land and the ritual of individuals.

The land was kept in order by four main ritual elements. The ritual of the indigenous 'owners of the land' was responsible for the wealth of fish and game in their small districts. These were made fruitful by prayer to the ancestors of their 'owners' and by the imposition of fishing and hunting seasons, as well as by annual ceremonies on the catch of the first fish as the floods began to fall. Secondly, nature spirits, *ngulu*, scattered somewhat sparsely over the country, had as their priests the headmen of the villages closest to them. In times of drought or in certain other misfortunes, these spirits were prayed to and sacrifices offered. Thirdly, there was the whole ritual of the political chief, Kazembe. The ritual was elaborate and was directed towards two main ends: towards the safety of the chief and the hieftainship and through that, as well as by separate ritual, towards the prosperity of the whole country. Kazembe prayed at any time of need to his own ancestors and could tell the owners of the land to offer prayer to theirs; or could tell village headmen to sweep out their villages and light new fires to cleanse the country of unfortunate influences. Fourthly, there was access to two important prophets, both living some distance away. Periodically Kazembe would send deputations to them with offerings in order to find out if misfortune were imminent, and to find out steps necessary to counteract it.

Missions do not favour customs of this sort. Lunda tend to identify all Europeans together as Government representatives and they fear that if missionaries realize they are carrying out these customs the Government will hear about it and punish them. Lunda do not realize that the Government is more tolerant than missions in matters of this

sort. Much of the more spectacular and conspicuous ritual has thus died out, but certain elements remain.

Kazembe XIV who died in 1950 was a conservative in matters of chieftainship, and at the same time was an educated able man with a desire for the advancement of his country. He was a 'Christian' who took his nine wives to church with him on Sundays. Although ever since the Europeans first appeared in the country the customs of chieftainship had been slowly disappearing, Kazembe XIV dropped many more. He appeared to be arbitrary in the customs which he let slide. From time to time he made public pronouncements on the state of Custom. On one occasion a question arose about the succession of a headman's widow. It is a custom that there should not be two ritual pots of chieftainship (or headmanship) in one village at one time; and Kazembe restrained the widow from being inherited in his own capital since there was a pot of chieftainship—his own—there already. He said: 'There are some customs which we Lunda have forgotten, but there are others which we must remember. Some of our old customs were no good, but some are good and it is wrong to forget them. The custom of the pots is an important custom and we must not forget it'. I could trace no common thread in the customs which have been dropped apart from those which involved killing people. For instance the chief is still washed in medicine before a death is announced to him, and it is still forbidden to move fire into or out of the palace grounds. But Kazembe no longer appeals to prophets, nor does he order village hearths to be swept, nor undertake first-fruit ceremonies, nor offer prayer to past Kazembes, nor live in the traditional papyrus-mat hut.

But in the ritual of the country restraint is imposed by the ancestors, by Lunda aristocrats, and by magicians. Ancestral will continues to be interpreted by the Lunda aristocrats. I give two examples of this kind of restraint. One night Kazembe XIV dreamed that the spirit of Kazembe II (who died about 1760) came to his palace. It removed the royal axe and broadsword from their official resting-places and set them on the palace fence. The spirit then came to Kazembe himself in his sleep and beat him up (a frequent dream-subject implying strong ancestral disapproval). The spirit then replaced the weapons and departed. Kazembe related his dream to the aristocrats, who said that the spirit had come because Kazembe was neglecting the customs. Thereupon Kazembe agreed, under pressure from the aristocrats, to the building of the traditional royal kitchen, one of the customs which he had hitherto declared unnecessary. Lunda claim however that this dream was the beginning of his illnesses which culminated in his early death.

The second illustration involves a minor prophet. In 1949 there was drought, and a man in the village in which I was staying became possessed by a wandering *kasesema* spirit and called the headman to his house. The spirit within him told the headman: 'I am not coming as I usually come, for this time I feel very angry about things. This country is in a bad way; the spirits who sent me do not like it and they

angry . . . In the old days we received rain, but now we do not. We will die of hunger because of the chief. Why does he not call the important people of the country to pray for rain? He does not care to do this, so we shall have many locusts, and they will have horns, and they will eat the food of the country . . . Now I have come to sweep out the village. We will throw out the old fire and bring in new as our ancestors did. You headman saw things like that in the old days because then the chief prayed to spirits. Nowadays you headman you are the chief and do not care to come to us. (The headman interpolated: 'No, the chief must agree') etc. etc. As a result of the appearance of this spirit, prayer was offered to a local nature spirit by the headman.

It may be asked how the ritual of the country can be carried out if it involves a number of people when some people are moderns and others conservatives. Firstly, the ritual is in fact mainly a matter for individuals. There are exceptions, of course: taboos affect everyone, such as the taboo upon anyone connected with a death and still un-urified coming into contact with the chief. But this to the people is simply a law, like any other command issuing from the chief, which is to be obeyed. Secondly, the Lunda at least make sure that anyone whom they appoint to fill a position of responsibility towards land and people is a pagan. All important appointments issue from the fence of Kazembe: they are made by agreement of Kazembe and the aristocrats. Kazembe himself owes his position to the aristocrats and purely Lunda matters—of which appointments are among the most important—he should listen to their advice. The aristocrats for their part have no place in the British scheme of administration and they can retain their position of power only by retaining the ritual and historical knowledge which are in their hands. If all ritual were to die out they would have nothing to do for the practical administration of the country is now in other hands. It is thus to their advantage as a body to ensure the maintainance of Lunda ritual and customs. On one occasion a sub-chieftaincy was vacant and the only man available to fill it had close connections with a mission. On his appointment the aristocrats addressed him in this way: 'Now you have become a chief, now you must be finished with your Christianity. If we find you are bringing Christianity into your Lundahood we will throw you out and find someone else'.

In the villages there is much ritual, for which the headman is responsible, for the safety and prosperity of their inhabitants. The headman is faced with a dilemma if he is a Christian for he may read into his teaching that it is wrong to deal with village medicines, which include sorcery for attracting people from other villages. But, since the majority of people still believe it is unsafe to live in a village without medicines for protection against sorcery and wild animals, the headman realises that without medicines he cannot retain his followers. Thus, if he is a Christian, it is his pagan brother of the same clan who looks after the village medicines with his full connivance.

With regard to individuals themselves, each is a member of a village and must take part in its ritual. There are one or two villages of extreme Watchtower sects which have dispensed by common agreement with all village ritual, but with this exception I have never seen evasion of duties, although of course it is impossible to check whether the numerous sex taboos are rigidly upheld. Here public opinion is a factor of great importance. Likewise there seems to be little evasion of customs which are controlled by clan elders. In more personal matters, however, the choice is open to the individual whether or not he follows the customs of the older people. Fishing and hunting medicines are less commonly used than before, for instance. There are two main groups who tend to forget customs: serious members of missions, and people who have seen the world and how other people behave, either through army experience or travel in towns.

For such people the custom of the marriage pot, for instance, is a nuisance and is lapsing. This is a pot given to a girl at her first marriage, and it is used for purification of herself and her husband after intercourse. It is a widely spread custom. Formerly if the pot were broken it would be pounded down and used to size another which would take its place. Nowadays there are people who use any pot that comes to hand for purification, and there are others who do not purify themselves at all. On one occasion I was on a bus with Bemba and Lunda and a Bemba woman's marriage pot slipped to the floor and was smashed. She started to weep for it, explaining that she was going to join her husband on the Copperbelt. Bemba who were with her told her not to worry because she could make a new pot with the sherds. The Lunda laughed at her because she was just a simple Bemba girl and told her they had forgotten the custom long ago, and came to no harm.

Lunda who have been abroad explain that they have dropped the custom because they have seen that other people do not have the custom and still they do not suffer for lack of it. To these, it is just so much of a nuisance. If one asks a person who uses the custom why these young men come to no harm by dropping it, the answer is that people can come to harm *mu kutontonkanyafye*—only if they think they will. You do not come to harm by neglecting a custom unless you believe in it. I challenged an old man to drop the custom like the younger men were doing. He replied he could not, for he was born under an old wind; the young men born under the winds of to-day could have the custom or not, as they liked. If they did not believe in it and dropped it they would come to no harm. The answer is the same if one asks why a Luba can eat lion-flesh safely. He can do so because he does not think he will come to harm: he does not know the custom of coming to harm through lions.

The following points may be noted for Luapula society:

1. Lunda do not distinguish linguistically between customs involving common-sense notions and customs involving mystical notions: both are *lutambi*.

2. These two types of custom are distinguished however in their treatment :

- (a) Customs involving common-sense notions are held to be universal in their effect.
- (b) Customs involving mystical notions are held to be universal in their effect only within a restricted group.

3. The group within which customs involving mystical notions have a universal effect is the tribe.

4. Tribal customs are indivisible, in that a tribe is always associated with a certain body of customs however much members of the tribe may deviate from them.

5. Tribal customs are maintained by the elders of clan sections belonging to the tribe, or by the aristocracy of the Lunda chieftainship.

6. The individual is not bound by the tribe into which he was born through matrilineal descent.

7. The individual may choose whether or not to forget tribal customs so long as they do not involve the well-being of other people.

8. The rationale for the last two points is that mystical judgment is an individual matter and mystical beliefs are said to be effective only for people who hold them.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN LABOUR BY AREA OF ORIGIN ON THE COPPER MINES OF NORTHERN RHODESIA

by

J. CLYDE MITCHELL

IT is generally appreciated that some copper mines draw their African labour predominantly from particular areas. In this paper I examine the statistical bases for this belief and make some observations on the change of distribution of labour by area of origin over the five years from March 1946 to March 1951.

I have derived the statistics used in this paper from a return produced by the Commissioner of Mines and Labour. It is produced quarterly and is called 'Origin of Labour Employed on Mines and Works in

TABLE I

PROPORTION OF LABOUR BY AREA OF ORIGIN IN EACH MINE, MARCH, 1951.

(Source : Commissioner of Mines and Labour's Return)

Total strength	Men per 1,000 total strength				
	R.A.C.M. 12,445	Nkana 14,051	Muful 11,171	Nchanga 8,653	Total 46,320
<i>Area of Origin :</i>					
Bartose Province	12.1	16.7	14.9	15.0	14.7
Central Province	144.4	66.8	65.6	21.6	78.9
Eastern Province	111.9	60.7	69.4	42.5	73.1
Northern Province	295.1	276.2	286.4	238.2	276.6
Southern Province	3.8	7.8	4.1	4.2	5.2
Western area ^a	42.7	87.8	82.3	188.6	93.2
Luapula area ^b	82.5	162.7	248.3	206.2	169.9
Peri-Copperbelt ^c	54.3	20.6	22.6	40.9	33.9
Congo	13.7	16.0	29.2	26.6	20.6
Nyasaland	95.9	49.9	58.7	48.3	64.1
Mozambique	14.9	4.4	6.2	1.1	7.1
Angola	34.9	40.5	41.4	91.4	48.7
Tanganyika	93.5	187.6	67.9	71.4	111.7
Elsewhere	0.2	2.3	3.0	4.0	2.3
Total	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0	1,000.0

^a Solwezi, Kasempa, Mwinilungu, Kabompo and Balovale districts.

^b Fort Rosebery and Kawambwa districts.

^c The urban districts, but including Ndola rural district.

Northern Rhodesia'. This return is compiled from the monthly returns of labour supplied by employers in terms of Regulation 67 under the Employment of Natives Ordinance. The return for the copper mines includes in it the labour on ancillary industries, as for example the wood-cutting industry. In Table I I have set out the proportion of labour from each area of origin for the four main copper mines on the Copperbelt. This table brings out the main features of the African labour supply to the copper mines in so far as its origin is concerned. By far most labour comes from the Northern Province, followed by the Luapula Valley, Tanganyika, the Western areas, Central Province, the Eastern Province and Nyasaland. The variation in proportions on each mine also emerges from this table. People from the Central Province seem to prefer the Roan Antelope Copper Mines; people from Tanganyika, Nkana; people from the Western areas, Mufulira; and people from Angola, Nchanga.

What this table conceals however, is that though people from one area may predominate in any particular town, the number of those people on that mine might be lower than what we may expect. Take for example the representation of the people from the Northern Province at Nchanga. At Nchanga there are 24 Northern Province men in every 100, which is more than from any other single area. Yet there are fewer Northern Province men at Nchanga than on the Copperbelt as a whole. If there were proportionately the same number of Northern Province workers at Nchanga as on the Copperbelt as a whole we should expect to find 27 of them out of every 100 workers.

To overcome this difficulty I have prepared Table II. In this table the number of people from any area on any mine is compared with a base figure of 100 which represents the number of people we could expect on that mine if no special factors contributed to their distribution amongst the copper mines. The reasoning runs as follows :

Let P_{ax} be the number of men from area 'a' on mine 'x'.

Let m_x be the total strength on Mine x; and m_y on Mine y, etc.

Let n_a be the total population from area 'a' on all mines, and n_b the total labour population from area 'b' on all mines, etc.

Let N be the total strength of African labour on all mines so that

$$\Sigma n = \Sigma m = N.$$

If the labour force were distributed amongst the mines on a chance basis alone we could expect the number of men from any area on any mine to be :

$$\frac{n.m.}{N}$$

We can now compare the actual number of men on any mine with this expected figure so that the index of representation for any area on any mine will be :

$$\frac{100 N p}{nm}$$

Where the number of men from any area on any mine is the same as we may expect on a chance basis this index will be 100. Where it is greater than we may expect the index will be greater than 100, and where there are fewer men than we may expect on a chance basis the index will be less than 100.

As an actual example :

The total number of men from the Eastern Province on all copper mines in March 1951 = 3,388(n). The total labour strength at the Roan Antelope Mine was 12,445 (= m), and the total strength on all mines together was 46,320 (= N). The actual number of Eastern Province men on the Roan Antelope Mine was 1,392 (= p).

Hence the index of representation of Eastern Province men on the Roan Antelope Mine is :

$$\frac{100 N p}{n m} = \frac{46,320 \times 1,392}{12,445 \times 3,388} = 152.9$$

Thus we may say that the Roan Antelope mine has 52.9% more men from the Eastern Province on its payroll than we might reasonably expect on chance.

TABLE II

INDICES OF REPRESENTATION OF LABOUR STRENGTH
OF DIFFERENT AREAS OF ORIGIN ON THE MINES,
MARCH 1951

	R.A.C.M.	Nkana	Muful	Nchanga	Total
<i>Area of Origin</i>					
Barotse Province	82.4	112.5	101.8	102.4	681
Central Province	182.8	84.7	83.2	27.4	3,656
Eastern Province	152.9	83.0	94.9	58.1	3,388
Northern Province	106.7	99.9	103.5	86.0	12,813
Southern Province	73.4	150.7	79.3	82.2	240
Western area	45.9	94.2	88.3	202.5	4,316
Luapula area	48.6	95.8	146.0	121.4	7,869
Peri-Copperbelt	160.2	60.6	66.8	120.4	1,572
Congo	66.8	78.1	141.7	129.2	952
Nyasaland	149.6	77.9	91.6	75.3	2,969
Mozambique	211.4	62.6	87.3	16.4	327
Angola	71.7	83.1	84.9	187.9	2,256
Tanganyika	83.6	167.9	60.8	63.9	5,176
Elsewhere	10.7	103.1	136.0	175.0	105
Total strength	12,445	14,051	11,171	8,653	46,320

The index of representation has the value of indicating the mines at which people are more numerous than we could expect by chance. Thus while we can say that at the Roan Antelope there are twice as

many people from the Northern Province as from any other area we find by consulting Table II that there are in fact only 6.7% more than we might reasonably expect. Instead, we find that the Roan Antelope Mine has twice as many men from Mozambique as we could expect and is very heavily over-represented by people from the Central Province. Nkana has more Tanganyika and Southern Province men, Nchanga draws more heavily on the Western area and Angola, while Mufulira draws most heavily from the Luapula and the Congo. On

TABLE III

INDEX OF REPRESENTATION FOR MARCH 1946
COMPARED WITH THAT FOR MARCH 1951 ON THE
FOUR MAIN COPPER MINES

Expected frequency = 100.

1946 figures in brackets.

	R.A.C.M.	Nkana	Muful	Nchanga	Total
<i>Area of Origin</i>					
Barotse Province	82.4 (114.0)	112.5 (98.4)	101.8 (88.0)	102.4 (91.7)	681 (700)
Central Province	182.8 (171.7)	84.7 (83.3)	83.2 (67.9)	27.4 (27.3)	3,656 (3,084)
Eastern Province	152.9 (133.1)	83.0 (78.4)	94.9 (94.8)	58.1 (88.6)	3,388 (2,200)
Northern Province	106.7 (122.1)	99.9 (94.6)	103.5 (90.7)	86.0 (77.2)	12,813 (9,497)
Southern Province	73.4 (200.0)	150.7 (66.7)	79.3 (34.0)	82.2 (68.0)	240 (207)
Western area	45.9 (47.4)	94.2 (102.9)	88.3 (109.0)	202.5 (208.2)	4,316 (2,858)
Luapula area	48.6 (50.1)	95.8 (100.7)	146.0 (151.5)	121.4 (127.3)	7,869 (5,438)
Peri-Copperbelt	160.2 (121.5)	60.6 (95.0)	66.8 (49.2)	120.4 (155.7)	1,572 (809)
Congo	66.8 (31.8)	78.1 (121.6)	141.7 (131.5)	129.2 (150.6)	952 (660)
Nyasaland	149.6 (93.9)	77.9 (118.6)	91.6 (94.8)	75.3 (71.3)	2,969 (2,030)
Mozambique	211.4 (144.7)	62.6 (86.7)	87.3 (57.1)	16.4 (106.7)	327 (126)
Angola	71.7 (84.3)	83.1 (91.9)	84.9 (113.9)	187.9 (137.2)	2,256 (1,591)
Tanganyika	83.6 (45.9)	167.9 (206.4)	60.8 (36.1)	63.9 (48.5)	5,176 (1,080)
Elsewhere	10.7 (213.3)	103.1 (47.1)	136.0 (63.6)	175.0 (33.3)	105 (49)
Total strength	12,445 (9,236)	14,051 (10,589)	11,171 (6,863)	8,653 (3,641)	(46,320 30,329)

the other side of the picture is the distinct paucity of men from the Western area and Luapala at the Roan Antelope; the comparatively few people from the peri-Copperbelt areas at Nkana; the under representation of Tanganyika men at Mufulira and the surprisingly poor representation of people from the Central Province at Nchanga.

In Table III I have set out the index representation for March 1946 against that for March 1951 so that the change, if any, over five years may be noted. On the whole we find that over the five years in review, very little change of the distribution of labour from different areas over the Copperbelt has taken place, particularly in so far as the labour of Northern Rhodesian origin is concerned.

Some of the more striking changes that appear to have taken place are :

- a. The Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines have gained more peri-Copperbelt labour at the expense of Nkana and Nchanga.
- b. The Roan Antelope and Mufulira mines have gained more Mozambique labour at the expense of Nkana and Nchanga.
- c. Roan Antelope mine has shown a considerable increase of Nyasaland labour against Nkana in particular.
- d. Nchanga has shown a considerable increase in Angolese labour as against the other three mines.
- e. Tanganyika labour has increased at the Roan Antelope Copper Mine, Mufulira and Nchanga but decreased at Nkada.

Now that we have established that labour from certain areas tends to be concentrated on certain mines we may examine the possible reason for this. The hypothesis which springs to mind immediately is that the connexion between one mine and an area supplying labour has developed historically because of the preference of the African Personnel Manager for labourers from one particular tribe. Before we accept this, however, we should examine one obvious feature which has emerged from these figures. It could best be illustrated by the disposition of tribesmen from the Luapula area. Mufulira has proportionately more than we could expect, had the distribution occurred purely by chance. Next is Nchanga, then Kitwe and finally the Roan Antelope. The implication of this is that labour coming into the Copperbelt from any particular area seems to seek employment initially at the first main centre and then move on to the second most distant centre. Consider again for example, the representation of labour from the Western areas. The highest representation is at Nchanga, followed by Nkana, then Mufulira, and finally the Roan Antelope. This seems to hold true for most distributions.

It appears then that the distribution of African labour on the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia is determined mainly by ecological factors and this hypothesis finds interesting confirmation when the 1951 figures are examined in greater detail.


TABLE IV

INDEX OF REPRESENTATION OF LABOUR STRENGTH
FROM DISTRICTS WITHIN NORTHERN RHODESIA
SUPPLYING LABOUR TO THE COPPER MINES,
MARCH 1951

	R.A.C.M.	Nkana	Mufulira	Nchanga	Total
<i>District of Origin</i>					
Broken Hill	179.5	92.0	63.9	45.4	448
Lusaka	114.0	68.3	145.7	72.3	111
Mkushi	186.5	73.8	96.3	22.9	840
Mumbwa	208.9	32.0	94.5	61.0	237
Serenje	182.9	94.7	77.2	18.8	2,019
Feira	372.2	—	—	—	1
Central Province	182.8	84.7	83.2	27.4	3,656
Abercorn	55.1	73.2	201.1	77.5	905
Chinsali	139.1	87.5	88.8	78.5	934
Isoka	88.7	92.6	115.5	108.1	1,242
Kasama	129.7	119.2	59.1	79.0	1,992
Luwingu	91.1	107.6	104.4	94.8	3,637
Mpika	165.6	92.1	74.2	51.8	2,241
Mporokoso	62.6	97.4	136.5	110.9	1,862
Northern Province	106.7	99.9	103.5	86.0	12,813
Kasempa	48.0	97.8	79.0	205.4	1,480
Mwinilunga	68.8	77.1	93.2	190.8	774
Balovale	41.8	78.6	129.7	180.2	1,372
Kabompo	—	175.1	—	250.1	96
Solwezi	27.6	130.4	23.7	253.1	594
Western area	45.9	94.2	88.3	202.5	4,316
Kawambwa	52.6	108.5	136.0	107.9	4,107
Fort Rosebery	44.2	81.8	157.2	135.8	3,762
Luapula area	48.6	95.8	146.0	121.4	7,869
Fort Jameson	161.1	93.1	75.5	55.1	1,456
Lundazi	112.4	67.5	142.6	80.8	596
Petauke	162.1	79.0	95.0	51.3	1,336
Eastern Province	152.9	83.0	94.9	58.1	3,388

Table IV sets out the index for representation for the main districts within the provinces which supply most labour to the Copperbelt. The main feature of this set of figures is more clearly seen from the map after page 36 on which are plotted the areas which supply more than expected numbers of men to each mine. On it are marked the main road routes. The point of entry to the Copperbelt from the east

and south is at Ndola. From the north the point of entry is at Mufulira though a road comes into Nchanga from the Congo. From the west the entry is through Nchanga. Nkana has no direct line of entry except the pedestrian traffic from Kasempa and Kabompo districts. The Roan Antelope is the nearest mine to Ndola, the entry point from the south and east. To get to Mufulira and Nchanga from Ndola traffic must pass through Nkana. Alternatively, to get from Nchanga to Mufulira or to the Roan Antelope, traffic must pass through Nkana.



When we examine the map we find that the Roan Antelope is over-represented by nearly all the areas on the eastern and southern routes. On the other hand, Nchanga is over-represented predominantly by areas on the western routes and to a lesser extent by the northern routes. Mufulira is over-represented predominantly by the areas on the northern routes. No clear pattern of over-representation of areas in Nkana emerges however, some being in the west and some on the northern routes but mainly fairly evenly distributed—a fact which is consistent with the 'isolated' position of Nkana from the point of view of the labour routes.

A few distributions, however, cannot be explained by this hypothesis. These are :

- a. The poor representation of Kasempa people at Nkana, having regard to the high proportion of Kabompo and Solwezi people there.
- b. The large representation of Balovale, Abercorn and Lundazi people at Mufulira.
- c. The large representation of Tanganyika people at Nkana.

To explain these variations, special knowledge of the particular mines is necessary and, as yet, I have made no attempt to elucidate these problems.



PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF LABOUR FROM DIFFERENT AREAS FOUND ON THE COPPER MINES


R.A.C.M. = Roan Antelope


Mu: = Mufulira

Nk: = Nkana

Nch: = Nchanga

..... = Main road routes





THE TONGA AND THE SHORTAGE OF IMPLEMENTS

by

ELIZABETH COLSON

IN 1945 a number of agriculturalists from the Northern Rhodesia Agricultural Department and an anthropologist from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute made a survey of land-holding and land-usage among the Plateau Tonga of Mazabuka District. Their report was published in 1948 as Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 14. While the survey presents a valid picture of the situation in Tonga country at that period, the investigators do not seem to have been sufficiently aware of how much the situation was affected by world conditions. They mention that Tonga housing had apparently deteriorated in the previous four years. They found that 40% of the Tonga families in the subsistence category, which contained 85.3% of the total number of families, owned no implements at all. Only 50% of these families owned a plough. Very few other implements were owned. Many of the ploughs needed repairs. Families frequently had to wait until friends or relatives had finished their ploughing before they could borrow a plough and plant their crop, either because they owned no plough or because the plough was broken.

The picture that emerges from the report is that of a rather listless people, content on the whole with an extremely low standard of living, battenning for assistance upon the energetic few who had emerged as smallholders or farmers. It may be unkind to suggest that certain preconceptions about African motives and behaviour coloured the investigators' approach to the problem.

Part of the shortage of equipment, and possibly also the lack of interest in producing a surplus for sale, may very well be attributed to the situation with which the Tonga were faced, and in which they were certainly not unique. They originally began to sell maize at the time when the Copperbelt was expanding and there was a demand for produce to feed the workers in the urban areas. In the 1930's, this market collapsed. For a number of years maize sold for an extremely low price, and it was probably impossible for the small producer either to build up a stock of implements or to re-equip himself as old equipment wore out. The market began to revive with the reopening of the mines as war became imminent, but the price for African maize remained low. After the beginning of the war, it became almost impossible to obtain new implements. Ploughs and cultivators, as well as other equipment, were in short supply. New parts were difficult to obtain. Those who were building new houses, or seeking to repair old buildings, were faced with a shortage of nails, cement,

and other building materials. In 1945, then, one would expect to find the Tonga, not unlike peasants in other parts of the world, dependent upon equipment which had already seen the wear and tear of a number of years when replacements and repairs were difficult or impossible to secure. As late as 1946, more than a year after the end of the war, a number of Tonga asked me to approach a European farmer in the district to ask if he would sell them his old cultivators. He had a long waiting list of Tonga anxious to purchase any implements that he might discard, but he was having to refuse their offers because he was unable to obtain new implements as replacement. This shows something of the situation with which the Tonga cultivators were faced at the time.

If the team conducting the survey had taken these facts into account, they might possibly have written in rather different terms, of a people faced with shortages beyond their control who were making the best of a bad situation by sharing what implements were available.

Furthermore, in 1945, there was a general shortage of consumer goods, and therefore less incentive to produce for a cash return. To-day it is generally recognized that people are more inclined to produce when there is some incentive. The Tonga presumably do not regard money as an end in itself, and when it could not be exchanged for something they wanted, they had the less reason to exert themselves to obtain it. Stocks in the trading stores along the railway line were low. Africans who wanted to start small stores and tea-rooms in the reserves were unable to get supplies to start.

Since the end of the war, despite the steady increase in prices and the fact that they have had three bad seasons, the Tonga have brought large numbers of ploughs and cultivators, bicycles and sewing machines. Many have bought disc ploughs. A few have bought second-hand motor cars, and more have bought wagons and carts. Many are building better houses, a few of which compare favourably with the better-class houses in the urban locations. A number of men have bought carpenters' tools, and they are turning out the door frames, doors, and wooden furniture for which there is a growing demand. A few men have even begun to specialize as builders and thatchers, working in the reserves for African clients, some of whom are demanding cement floors and attempts at ant-coursing.

Despite the efforts of the Agricultural Department and the introduction of the improved farmer bonuses, it is doubtful if the Tonga have been revolutionized since 1945. But they can now buy, at some price, the implements which they need and other goods which they desire, and they have responded to this fact with some enthusiasm.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER

Department of Social Anthropology,
Dover Street,
Manchester, 13.

11th July, 1952.

The Director,
The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute,
P.O. Box 195,
Livingstone,
Northern Rhodesia.

Dear Sir,

Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 14 :
*Land-holding and Land-usage among
the Plateau Tonga of Northern
Rhodesia*

The above paper was published as a result of a survey we made in the Mazabuka district in 1945. After our survey Dr. Colson carried out intensive social anthropological research in the district between 1947 and 1951. She came to the conclusion that in our analysis of land-holding and land-usage among the Tonga we had not allowed sufficiently for the effect on Tonga agriculture of war-time shortage of implements and consumer goods. At our request she put her criticism in the form of a short note and, since we accept it, we should be grateful if you would print it in the Rhodes-Livingstone Journal and arrange as far as possible for its distribution to readers of our report itself.

Now that Dr. Colson has made this point to us we recall that during the war it was often so difficult to get hoes, axes, nails, hinges, etc., that the Government was encouraging the few remaining African smiths to produce these goods.

Continuity of study is essential to a real understanding of a people. Our study was carried out over a short period and it therefore gives a picture of the Tonga only at one point of time—the end of the war period. At that time shortages were and had for long been so usual that we may have slipped into the error of accepting them as part of the normal pattern. The Tonga, apparently, did so too, since they rarely if ever mentioned shortages or lack of incentive as reasons for not acquiring implements, for not improving their agriculture or for not repairing their buildings.

We accept the criticism that we should have given greater weight to these factors, and we agree that they do account in some degree for the seeming listlessness and lack of initiative we observed. It is,

however, possible to exaggerate their effects and difficult to say to what extent they operated. Ploughs, though in short supply, were in fact on sale at the trading stores at the time of our study. The shortage and increased value of implements and the lack of spares had not stimulated the Tonga to take greater care of them—they were often left to rust in the fields where they had last been used. In many cases building repairs which could have been carried out with readily available local material had been neglected. The contrast between the bulk of people and the few progressives, who had endured the same disabilities, was striking.

In the case of almost any people, increased incentive is bound to attract a greater number to the ranks of the progressives—a fact which we recognized when we first proposed the 'Improved Farmer' scheme—and we are glad to know that this is happening among the Tonga.

Yours faithfully,

W. ALLAN,

M. GLUCKMAN.

C. G. TRAPNELL,

D. U. PETERS.

NEW LIGHT ON SOCIAL RELATIONS
AN APPRECIATION OF GEORGE C. HOMANS'S

THE HUMAN GROUP *

by

M. G. MARWICK

A PART from being a landmark in small-group sociology, Homans's book is of considerable 'international' importance. It emphasizes the link between general sociology, which is now mainly domiciled in the United States, and comparative sociology, which, under the name of social anthropology, has flourished best in the United Kingdom. Here for the first time, a general sociologist makes full acknowledgment of the theoretical contributions of Radcliffe-Brown and of the value of British traditions of anthropological field-work exemplified in Firth's study of the Tikopia.¹ Homans's incidental acknowledgment in a footnote that Radcliffe-Brown's ideas 'have become so much a part of anthropological thinking that their author is often forgotten'² marks but one of the many points at which he draws on the theories and materials of what (undeservedly) is sometimes referred to as the British 'school' of social anthropology.³ Perhaps the best way of bringing out the salient features of *The Human Group* is to compare it with another American book that it is destined to follow into a place of estimation among British social scientists, viz., Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action*.⁴ The task common to both Homans and Parsons is the weaving of theoretical loose ends. While Parsons picks up some of the threads left by the great theorists, Pareto, Durkheim⁵ and Weber, Homans does a similar service for sociologists engaged in more empirically-oriented, some-

* *The Human Group*. By George C. Homans. Pp. xxvi—484, illus., maps. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1950. \$6.00. Also London: Kegan Paul (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction), 1952. 25s.

¹ *We the Tikopia: A Sociological Study of Kinship in Primitive Polynesia*. By R. Firth. Allen & Unwin, 1936.

² p. 422n.

³ G. P. Murdock, 'British Social Anthropology', *American Anthropologist*, iii (1951), 474-89.

⁴ Free Press, Illinois, 1949.

⁵ With the qualification (made by Parsons) that Durkheim's *Suicide*, as an exemplary combination of theory and empirical observation, is not to be classed as 'pure theory'.

times applied, research—such as Whyte's study of street-corner society, Firth's of the Tikopia, and the work of Mayo's team (of which Homans was a member) at the Hawthorne works.⁶

In effectively concerning themselves with theoretical principles both Parsons and Homans dispel the popular notion that sociology is in its infancy (or in a prolonged, mentally-deficient childhood) for want of empirical facts; and they both offer constructive correctives—in the form of theoretical systems—to the all-too-common tendency sociologists have of assembling facts as insignificant in their theoretical implications as they are significant in their statistical proportions.

Parsons explores the theoretical systems of the first great generation of sociologists and builds up—from what they didn't say as much as from what they said—the most satisfactory solution to the problem of social order that we have had since this problem was first posed (with any clarity) by Hobbes. In a similar manner Homans gleans from the leaving of many reapers raw material for what is probably the most effective analysis yet made of the processes at work in the small group.

Fortunately there is an important difference between the two books we have been comparing—their readability. Parsons obscures most of his ideas in a ponderous style whereas Homans uses language that is simple and forceful though on occasion jarringly colloquial. Parsons administers a theoretical overdose in his first three chapters whereas Homans grades his material in such a way that his hypotheses may be introduced step by step with the simpler, more general forms preceding the exceptions and qualifications which he brings in only when his material demands them. Spratt summed up his review of *The Structure of Social Action* by saying: 'I have attempted to give some idea of the riches that await the determined prospector in this enormous dark cavern of a book. It is well worth penetrating . . . but one can easily lose one's way . . .'.⁷ Homans's riches are not hidden in a dark cavern, but are exhibited in a carefully planned sequence and illuminated by a lucid style. Some readers may even be irritated by the thoroughness with which Homans drives home his points, with an inevitable tendency towards repetition. But, as this is born of consideration for the reader—a trait that many technical writers lack—it can be defended.

Although Homans uses language naturally and forcefully he does so self-consciously. He is ever on the alert for the dangers lurking in a careless phrase; and at many points he reminds us of the inadequacy of human speech as a means of describing and recording social processes, and of its limitations as an analytical tool in the sense that it cannot 'say everything at once', i.e., cannot take full account—except by circuitous description—of complex interdependence of factors and cumulative effect of processes. Thus he says:

⁶ *Management and the Worker*: by Roethlisberger and Dickson. (Harvard University Press, 1950).

⁷ *British Journal of Sociology*, i (1950), 260-63 at p. 263.

. . . Ordinary language, with its subjects and predicates, is geared to handling only one independent factor and one dependent factor at a time: someone is always doing something to somebody. Cause-and-effect thinking rather than mutual-dependence thinking is built into speech. Yet a situation that can accurately be described in cause-and-effect terms is just the kind that is encountered least often in sociology. Here the cause produces an effect, but the effect rests on the cause. In these circumstances, the very first effort to use ordinary language shows how crude a tool it is (p. 98).

Again, when he discusses group and environment, he says that the relationship between them is essentially one of action and reaction:

. . . It is circular. But perhaps it is safer to say that it sounds circular when described in words and sentences. When we describe a phenomenon in ordinary language, we are bound to start with a particular statement, going on from there to a sequence of further statements, and if the phenomenon is complex and organic, the sequence has a way of coming back sooner or later to the statement with which we started. No doubt a series of simultaneous equations could describe the characteristics of the group more elegantly than words and sentences can but we do not yet have the equations and it may be that the equations cannot be set up before the verbal description has been made. If then, we are limited to ordinary language, and if the tendency of ordinary language is to make the analysis of complex organic wholes sound circular, we propose in this book to relax, to fall in with this tendency of language rather than fight against it, and to analyze the relationship between group and environment as if it were a process having a beginning and an end, even though the point at which the process ends may be the point from which it started. Let us be candid and admit the method is clumsy, though it may be the best we have (pp. 91-2).

The Human Group covers a wide field. It has much to contribute to the theories of social interaction, leadership (in relation to both social control and social change) and the dynamics of civilizations. In doing so it painlessly (to say the least) equips the reader with more than a nodding acquaintance with the fields of industrial sociology, clique observation, community study and primitive social organization. Yet refreshingly unlike the average sociology textbook it is far from being a themeless miscellany of topics. Its interesting variety is integrated by the fact that each of its elements has a bearing on the structure and processes of the small group.

It would be out of place in review to attempt a complete account of Homans's concepts and the interesting system of hypotheses that he develops from their use. It is important to note that the hypotheses form a *system*, a fact that may be hidden by the random character of the following references. These references, furthermore, are inevitably

stripped of a wealth of supporting material; but they may serve to whet the prospective reader's appetite.

Following L. J. Henderson's general assertion that you should use 'as few variables as you dare, as many as you must', Homans starts with the following three relating to group life activity, interaction and sentiment. None of these is a simple variable to which a single series of numerical values may be given. Each has a number of aspects. Thus an activity may be gauged in terms of output, of efficiency, or of similarity to other forms of activity. Interaction may be recorded in terms of its frequency, its duration and the order in which it occurs (i.e., by whom it is initiated). And a sentiment (which Homans defines arbitrarily for his purposes to comprise all internal states of the human body including drives, emotions, feelings, affective states, sentiments and attitudes) has various aspects such as the number of persons holding it, the conviction with which it is held, its direction, its valence—and so on. He then proceeds by means of carefully graded illustrations to show the interesting relations among these three variables. He is careful to emphasize at all stages their mutual dependence and cumulative effects. Another important variable, which in his considerate way he introduces when and only when the complexity of his material demands it, is that of norm—and here we have a link with Parsons. Homans defines a norm as 'an idea in the minds of the members of a group, an idea that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should do, ought to do or are expected to do, under given circumstances.' (p. 123)

So much for the elements of analysis. The functional unity in which they operate together is the social system. Homans says 'Our definition of the group (which he makes in terms of interaction—see p. 84) draws a line between the systems we shall study and their different environments. The activities, interactions and sentiments of the group members, together with the mutual relations of these elements with one another during the time the group is active, constitute what we shall term the *social system*. The rest of the book will be made up of detailed analyses of social systems. Everything that is not part of the social system is part of the environment in which the system exists.' (p. 87)

This distinction between system and environment leads to a subsidiary one between the two divisions of a social system, the external and the internal. The external system comprises those relations among members that are necessitated by the group's having to survive in its environment. Relations of authority and subordination are often of this kind. The internal system comprises the elaboration of social behaviour springing from the association of the human beings brought together by the external system—an elaboration going 'beyond the demands of the original situation.' (p. 109) As Homans puts it, 'We shall not go far wrong if . . . we think of the external system as group behaviour that enables the group to survive in its environment

and think of the internal system as group behaviour that is an expression of the sentiments towards one another developed by the members of the group in the course of their life together.' (p. 109-10) For instance, the linked activities, the formal interactions and the hatred or reverence that characterize the relation between a seaman and a ship's officer belong to the external system: they arise from the problem of group survival in a hostile—or potentially hostile—environment; whereas the co-operative pastimes, the horseplay and the friendships found in the fo'c'sle or the wardroom are features of the internal system: they are outgrowths from a situation brought about by the social implications of the external system.

It becomes increasingly evident that a future part of sociological training will have to be in the fundamentals of communications engineering. The dynamic nature of social processes causes writers to fall back on analogies such as *steady state*,⁸ *build-up*, *feed-back* etc. In describing how the internal system 'arises out of the external and then reacts upon it' (p. 151), Homans says:

... The internal system is continually emerging out of the external and continually feeding back to modify the external system, or rather, to build up the social system as a whole into something more than the external system we started with. Although the necessities of our method of exposition make one come after the other, the processes we call the external and internal systems go on together in reality. (p. 153)

Equipped with Homans's chief concepts, analytical and functional, we may now nibble at some of his hypotheses. Most of these are concerned with the relations between his four variables, activity, interaction, sentiment and norms. The simplicity of these hypotheses makes one wonder why no one, before Homans, had explicitly stated them. And yet they have a freshness about them that saves them from being banal statements of the obvious. Furthermore, they are illustrated and tested by a wealth of material drawn from the Hawthorne research, the study of the Irish family by Arensberg and Kimball,⁹ Firth's Tikopia, Whyte's Norton Street Gang,¹⁰ and two lesser-known studies—of 'Hilltown'¹¹ and 'The Electrical Equipment Company'.¹²

We may pass over Homans's study of the mutual dependence of sentiment and activity as of greater interest to the neo-behaviourist school of psychology than to sociology, and concern ourselves with the other two possible combinations of his first three variables. In any

⁸ cf. G. Bateson, 'Bali: the Value System of a Steady State.' In *Social Structure*, (Oxford University Press, 1949).

⁹ *Family and Community in Ireland*: Harvard University Press, 1940.

¹⁰ *Street Corner Society*: Chicago University Press, 1943.

¹¹ 'Changes in the Structure and Function of a Rural New England Community since 1900', by D. L. Hatch (unpublished thesis).

¹² 'Determination of Morale in an Industrial Company' *Applied Anthropology* (1942), 12-34.

group, *activity and interaction* are mutually dependent in the sense that all activities of social consequence have to be co-ordinated—whether for the purely negative purpose of preventing the friction resulting from group members' pursuing disharmonious activities, or for the positive one of bringing greater efficiency to co-operative pursuits. The preservation of peace or the productive division of labour demands control and co-ordination which is impossible without interaction. The pattern of interaction that emerges from this necessity tends to be pyramidal in form with the leader or leading group, e.g., committee of management, at the apex of the pyramid. Once the pattern of interaction has emerged, interaction governs activity just as activity necessitates interaction.

The mutual dependence of *interaction and sentiment* is perhaps more interesting. It gives a satisfactory answer to the question how social relations become differentiated into what an older generation of sociologists called 'primary' and 'secondary'. Homans starts with the general proposition that the more frequent the interaction between persons the stronger their sentiment of liking or affection for one another. This can be supported by a number of instances, whether supplied by Homans or conjured up by his reader. And yet, as examination will soon show, it is a general statement, one having certain 'exceptions'. Remembering Pareto's dictum that what appear to be exceptions to a law are due to the superposition on its effects of the effects of other laws, let us examine the qualifications that have to be taken in association with this general hypothesis—the 'other laws' of Pareto's statement. We know of many instances where the general correlation between frequency of interaction and the strength of positive affection breaks down. Neighbours, fellow workers, or members of the same family may, contrary to the hypothesis, hate each other, rather than like each other, in proportion to the frequency of their interaction. These instances can generally be taken care of by the qualification that the activities of the interacting persons should be similar—or at any rate complementary—if positive sentiment is to result from frequent interaction. Neighbours who perform similar activities such as chatting over the common hedge or going to market together tend, with increased interaction, to form positive emotional bonds; whereas those whose activities are conflicting or ill-timed, e.g., one playing his radio early in the morning and the other late at night, are likely to do the opposite.

Another exception to this general proposition has to do with the status of the interacting persons. Where marked difference in status between them introduces formality to their interaction, there is little likelihood that positive sentiment will emerge, however frequent the interaction. Homans illustrates this qualification from the father-son relation in the Irish family. In more general terms he says :

... We have seen that the more frequent the interaction between people the stronger in general their sentiments of liking

or affection for one another. But in the interaction between people we have also seen that, as one person gives orders that another must obey, the interaction between them tends to decrease toward the amount required by the external system—interaction is largely ‘on business’—and the emotional attitude of the subordinate towards the superior tends to be one of respect rather than close friendship. The relationship between a given leader and his follower will be determined by both of these hypotheses. To the extent that the two merely interact with one another, sentiments or affection will grow up between them, and their interaction will increase ‘socially’ beyond the amount required by the external system. To the extent that one gives orders that the other must obey, social interaction will be held down and sentiment will move in the direction of respect or, at worst, antagonism (p. 444).

Readers familiar with Radcliffe-Brown’s analysis of joking and avoidance relationships will find a fascinating field for the testing of Homans’s hypothesis.

The possibility that one person, in the words of the passage just quoted, can ‘give orders that the other must obey’ leads us to refer very briefly to Homans’s important analysis of leadership in relation to both social control and social change. A person who is in a position to make others obey him is one having superior social rank, which Homans explains as follows:

... A person of higher social rank than another originates interaction for the latter more often than the latter originates interaction for him (p. 145).

In a given group the leader has the highest social rank. Homans discusses the factors leading to the maintenance or the loss of the leader’s social rank, and thus the basis of his authority. One of his most important statements here is that a leader in order to maintain his social rank must conform more closely to the norms of his group than any of his followers. The concept of norm proves useful also in Homans’s examination of the processes of social change exemplified in the disorganization of a business firm and the disintegration of a small urban community.

One of the most interesting chapters deals with social control. In it Homans subscribes to the view that social control inheres within the structure of the group itself and is not to be accounted for in terms of external factors. He bases his theory of social control on the concept of ‘virtual movements’, and it accords with Durkheim’s view that the function of punishment is to express forcibly the values of the group. It is summarized as follows:

... A social system is in equilibrium and control is effective when the state of the elements that enter the system and of the mutual relationships between them is such that any small change

in one of the elements will be followed by changes in the other elements tending to reduce the amount of that change (p. 301).

The freshness of Homans's approach is exemplified again and again in his book. For instance, his comments on the modern urban family, though at times too emphatic and value-laden to have an objective ring, are nevertheless some of the most incisive to be found on this much-discussed aspect of our social organization. And at a time when America's power is accorded greater respect than her international maturity it is comforting to be reminded by Homans's chapter on the dynamics of civilizations that the objective standards of social science are being brought to bear on problems of large scale human organization that are generally left to the doubtful care of national emotionalism.

When someone produces a book on comparative sociology one naturally wonders about his qualifications in terms of entrenched interests and actual experience. Homans could scarcely be better fitted to the task he has set himself in *The Human Group*. The biographical information to be gleaned from dust-cover, footnotes and the *Directory of American Scholars* does not amount to much, but it does suggest that his experience as one of the collaborators in the Hawthorne project gives him the insight into small-group dynamics that is characteristic of the industrial sociologist; that his firm grounding in history—especially his impressive study of the thirteenth century English village¹³—enables him to see the place of the small group in the totality of human society; and that his experiences as a naval officer commanding three small ships during the Second World War have given him excellent opportunities for observing at first hand—and no doubt experimenting with—the small group.

A review can never be a substitute for the book. I hope I have said enough to show that *The Human Group* is readable, stimulating and important.

¹³ Homans : G. C., *English Villages in the Thirteenth Century*.

Local readers will be interested to know that all of the books mentioned in this review are available to members of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute at its library in Lusaka.—Ed.

NOTES

Institute's New Headquarters

In November 1952, the Institute moved from Livingstone to its new headquarters, five miles from Lusaka on the Great East Road. The new buildings have been financed by a grant from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund. They include library, research rooms, offices, and staff houses, situated pleasantly on a hill slope in virgin bush. It is expected that the building programme will have been completed by September 1953, when the official opening of the new Institute is to take place.

New Appointments to the Staff

During 1952 two new appointments were made to the research staff, and two to the administrative staff. Mr. A. L. Epstein is to make a study of urban native administration, and Miss Elsey Richardson is to do nutritional and family research on the Copperbelt. Mrs. Veronica Rybicka, who had been Librarian for two years, resigned when the Institute moved to Lusaka, and Mrs. Ursula Stevenson has taken up the appointment. Miss Merran McCulloch has been appointed Administrative Secretary.

Mr. Epstein took a Law degree at Queen's University, Belfast, and after a brief spell in the Royal Navy was called to the English Bar. He became interested in social anthropology and spent a year at the London School of Economics studying that subject before coming to Northern Rhodesia in 1950 under a Colonial Social Science Research Council studentship to make a study of urban courts. Later he worked as research assistant in the Department of Social Anthropology at the University of Manchester.

Miss Richardson graduated in Botany at London University in 1940. After three years' teaching, she took a post as research assistant to the Lister Institute and later worked for the Human Nutrition Unit. During 1947 and 1948 she worked on the Nutritional and Sociological Survey of the Gambia, and subsequently on the Social and Economic Survey of Sierra Leone.

Mrs. Stevenson took her degree in English and History at Cambridge in 1930 and after training in librarianship at University College, London, became a Fellow of the Library Association. She was Librarian to the Froebel Foundation, London, and later to the Colonial Department of the Institute of Education in London University. She came to Northern Rhodesia in 1947 with her husband, who is on the staff of Munali African Secondary School.

Miss McCulloch graduated in Philosophy at the University of New Zealand in 1945, and after a short period of teaching went to the London School of Economics to study Social Anthropology. From 1948 to 1952 she worked for the International African Institute, preparing monographs for the Ethnographic survey on the peoples of Sierra Leone, the Lunda-Lovale peoples of Central Africa, the Ovimbundu of Angola, and the Tikar of the French Cameroons. She also compiled a survey of studies bearing on the social effects of industrialization in tropical Africa. For a short period she worked as London Representative of the University College, Ibadan.

SOME RECENT ACQUISITIONS TO THE LIBRARY

Ethnography and Social Surveys

I. General

- Linton, Ralph, ed., *Most of the World: the Peoples of Africa, Latin America and the East To-day*, (Columbia University Press, 1949).
Locke, Alain, and Stern, Bernhard J., eds., *When Peoples Meet: a Study in Race and Culture Contacts* (Hinds, Hayden & Eldredge, 1946).

II. In Africa

- Adam, L., *De Soedan-Kwestie* (Afrika Instituut—Studie Centrum), (Universitaire Pers, Leiden, 1952).
Butt, Audrey, *The Nilotes of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Uganda*, (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part IV.) (International African Institute, 1952.) 15s.
Kuper, Hilda, *The Swazi* (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, Southern Africa, Part I.) (International African Institute, 1952.) 7s. 6d.
McCulloch, Merran, *The Ovimbundu of Angola* (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Central Africa, Part II.) (International African Institute, 1952.) 7s. 6d.
McCulloch, Merran, *The Southern Lunda and Related Peoples: Northern Rhodesia, Angola, Belgian Congo* (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, West Central Africa, Part I.) (International African Institute, 1952.) 8s. 6d.
Prins, A. H. J., *The Coastal Tribes of the North-Eastern Bantu: Pkomo, Nyika, Teita* (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part III.) (International African Institute, 1952.) 10s. 6d.
Whiteley, Wilfred, *Bemba and Related Peoples of Northern Rhodesia: with a contribution on the Ambo by B. Stefaniszyn*. Slaski, J., *Peoples of the Lower Luapula Valley* (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, East Central Africa, Part II.) (International African Institute, 1951.) 9s. 6d.

III. In the Americas

- Nimuendaju, Curt, *The Tukuna*, ed. by Robert H. Lowie, tr. by W. D. Hohenthal. (University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology, Vol. 45.) (University of California Press, 1952.) \$3.50.

IV. In India

Desai, N. C., *Report on the Hindu Joint Family System*, (Baroda State Press, 1936.) Rs. 1.5.

African Travel, History and Biography

Stewart, James, *The Zambesi Journal of James Stewart*, 1862-1863; ed. by J. P. R. Wallis, Central African Archives, the Oppenheimer Series : 6. (Chatto & Windus, 1952.) 35s.

Wills, W. A., Collingridge, L. T., and others, *The Downfall of Lobengula : the cause, history and effect of the Matabele War*. (The African Review, London, 1894.) 25s.

African Languages : Linguistics

Van Bulck, le R. P. G., *Manuel de Linguistique Bantoue*, Institut Royal Colonial Belge, Section des Sciences Morales et Politiques. *Mémoires*. Collection in-8°. Tome XVII, fasc. 3 et dernier. (Librairie Falk Fils, Georges van Campenhout, Successeur, 1949.)

Sociology

Murdock, George P., and others, *Outline of Cultural Material*, 3rd rev. edn. Behavior Science Outlines, Vol. 1. (Human Relations Area Files, 1950.)

Welfare Council of Metropolitan Los Angeles (Research Department), *Group Dynamics : implications for Social Work*, Special Report Series No. 24. (Los Angeles, California, 1950.) 12s. 6d.

Whyte, William Foote, ed., *Industry and Society* (McGraw Hill Book Co., 1946.)

General History

Coulton, G. G., *Mediaeval Panorama : the English Scene from Conquest to Reformation*. (O. U. P., 1949.) 50s.

Ewen, C. L'Estrange, *Witch Hunting and Witch Trials : the Indictments for Witchcraft from the Records of 1373 Assizes held for the Home Circuit A.D. 1559-1736*. (Kegan Paul, 1929.) 25s.

Glottz, Gustav, *The Greek City and its Institutions*. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950.) 25s.

Glover, T. R., *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*. (Methuen, 1910.) 15s.

Homans, George Caspar, *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century*. (Harvard University Press, 1942.)

Kern, Fritz, *Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages*, tr. with an introduction by S. B. Chrimes. (Blackwell, 1948.) 18s.

Klingberg, Frank J., and Hustvedt, Sigard B., eds., *The Warning Drum : the British Home Front Faces Napoleon*. Broadside of 1803. Publications of the William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, (University of California Press, 1944.) \$4.00.

- Lipson, E., *The Economic History of England, Vol. 1. The Middle Ages*, 10th edn. (A. & C. Black, 1949.) 35s.
- Luquet, G. -H., *The Art and Religion of Fossil Man*, tr. by J. Townsend Russell. (Yale University Press, 1930.) \$5.00.
- Medley, Dudley Julius, *A Student's Manual of English Constitutional History*, 6th edn. (Blackwell, 1925.) 12s. 6d.
- Morgan, R. B., ed., *Readings in English Social History, from pre-Roman days to A.D. 1837*. (O.U.P., 1923.)
- Peake, Harold and Fleure, Herbert John, *The Corridors of Time*, Vols. 1-7. (Yale University Press, 1927-31.) \$2.00 per vol.
- Stubbs, William, *Select Charters, and other illustrations of English constitutional history*, arr. and ed. by William Stubbs. 9th edn., revised by H. W. C. Davis. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1913.) 15s.
- Waters, Charlotte M., *An Economic History of England, 1066-1874*, (O.U.P., 1947.) 15s.

Religion

- Frazer, Sir James George, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament : Studies in Comparative Religion, Legend and Law*. (Macmillan, 1923.) 20s.
- Frazer, Sir James George, *Myths of the Origin of Fire : an essay*. (Macmillan, 1930.) 16s.

Philosophy

- Popper, K. R., *The Open Society and its Enemies : Vol. I, The Spell of Plato. Vol. II., The High Tide of Prophecy : Hegel, Marx and the Aftermath*. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952.) 42s.

Natural Science

- Schnell, R., *Vegetation et Flore de la Region Montagneuse du Nimba (Afrique Occidentale francaise)*, Mémoires de l'Institut Francais d'Afrique Noire, No. 22. (Ifan-Dakar, 1952.) 3,700 fr. metro.
- Thomson, J. Arthur, *Concerning Evolution*. (Yale University Press, 1925.) \$2.50.

Law

- Palmer, Horace S., ed., *Law Reports of Northern Rhodesia, 1945-1948*. (1949.) 21s.

Colonial Administration

- Hailey, Lord, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, (H.M.S.O., 1950-1.)
- Part 1, *East Africa : Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika*. 17s. 6d.
- Part 2, *Central Africa : Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia*. 10s. 6d.
- Part 3, *West Africa : Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Gambia*. 17s. 6d.

Part 4, *A General Survey of the System of Native Administration*. 5s.

Rolin, Henri, *Les Lois et l'Administration de la Rhodésie*. (Bruylant, Bruxelles; Challamel, Paris, 1913.) 35s.

Soward, F. H., ed., *The Changing Commonwealth: Proceedings of the Fourth Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conference held at Bigwin Inn, Ontario, Canada, 8-18 September, 1949*. Issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. (O.U.P., Toronto, 1950.) 16s.

Reference and Year Books

Southern Rhodesia; Central African Statistical Office, *Official Year Book of Southern Rhodesia, No. 4—1952, with Statistics mainly up to 1950*. (Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Co., Ltd., Salisbury, 1952.) 10s.

Bibliographies

Cox, D. L., comp., *A Bibliography of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, up to June 30th, 1949*. (University of Cape Town School of Librarianship, 1949.) 6s. 6d. (Roneod.)

Gann, L. H., comp., *A Bibliography of the Opening Up of the Territories north of the Zambezi, 1890-1924*. (Typescript.)

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
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